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INTRODUCTION
According to the prevailing wisdom in academic public law,
constitutional theory is a field that seeks to articulate and evaluate
abstract accounts of the nature of the United States Constitution.
Theorists offer those accounts as guides to subsequent judicial
construction of constitutional provisions.1 As typically conceived,
therefore, constitutional theory tends to proceed analytically from the
general to the particular; its animating idea is that correct decisions in
constitutional cases presuppose theoretical commitments to the
methodological principles that should guide constitutional
interpretation and the substantive values such interpretation should
advance.2
In its enthusiasm for abstraction, constitutional theory has, at
times, generated accounts of judicial behavior that are removed from
the realities of judicial practice.3 Indeed, it may not be an
overstatement to suggest that a basic disconnect exists between the
turn to theory in legal academia and the actual practice of
constitutional adjudication. At the Supreme Court bar, for example,
the Justices — and thus the appellate advocates who appear before
them — appear more interested in grappling with the law and facts of
the case at hand than they are eager to articulate or apply grand
theories about the “fundamental nature” of the Constitution.
A few academic commentators share the Court’s point of view and
have sought to redirect the path of academic constitutional law.
Robert Post, for example, notes that constitutional theory is associated
with “certain political philosophies that aspire to systematic analysis
based on first principles,” and he argues that constitutional theory
should instead seek “to expose and clarify the principles immanent

1. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L.
REV. 535, 537 (1999) (“[B]y [constitutional theory,] I mean theories about the nature of the
United States Constitution and how judges should interpret and apply it.”); Richard A.
Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1998) (“Constitutional
theory, as I shall use the term, is the effort to develop a generally accepted theory to guide
the interpretation of the Constitution of the United States.”).
2. See generally Fallon, supra note 1 (identifying the criteria that should inform the
individual’s selection of “a good constitutional theory” for subsequent application to
constitutional questions). The title and subject of Professor Fallon’s article evidence the
highly theoretical bent of contemporary constitutional theorists.
3. The exploits of Hercules, for example, are well known. See RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE 239-412 (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105-130
(1977).

SIEGEL 5.DOC

August 2005]

7/11/2005 8:17 AM

A Theory in Search of a Court

1953

within the practice of constitutional adjudication.”4 Constitutional
theory, he suggests, ought to be “always, so to speak, within our
tradition and our history; it [ought to be] parasitic on the very practice
it seeks to explain.”5 On this conception of the field’s role,
constitutional theory should endeavor to articulate, order, and assess
the broader principles latent in the Supreme Court’s decisions, and it
should do so through relatively inductive analyses — accounts in
which real constitutional cases and legal doctrines play a prominent
role in formulating the theory itself.
If constitutional theory is to turn back to the context in which
constitutional controversies are resolved — to the extant practice of
constitutional adjudication — the field must be able to account for a
basic descriptive reality. The Supreme Court, it would seem
uncontroversial to suggest, assumes different postures in different
cases. Sometimes, as in the historic example of Brown v. Board of
Education,6 the Justices step up and forcefully expound the
fundamental law regardless of how polarizing an issue may be. At
other times, as in the controversial case of Naim v. Naim,7 the Court
steps back, its voice inaudible; the Justices make the pragmatic
judgment that the time is not right for the Court’s intervention, even
despite the obvious importance and unconstitutionality of the state
action at issue. On most occasions, the Justices do speak, and they
adjust the volume of their pronouncements depending upon a
multitude of considerations; their opinions fall somewhere along the
decisional spectrum bounded by Brown and Naim.8
Viewed within this legal landscape, the position advanced by one
distinguished constitutional theorist is striking. Cass R. Sunstein of the
University of Chicago agrees that the field has taken an untoward turn
to theory:
Observers, including academic observers, tend to think that the
Supreme Court should have some kind of “theory.” But as a general rule,
those involved in constitutional law tend be cautious about theoretical
claims. For this reason, much of academic work in constitutional law has
been out of touch with the actual process of constitutional interpretation,
4. Robert Post, Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Judicial Review, 86 CAL. L. REV.
429, 429 (1998).
5. Id.; see also Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L.
REV. 593 (1999) (rejecting the suggestion that judges and constitutional scholars should
“choose” constitutional theories that they then use to resolve concrete disputes, and arguing
instead that theories of constitutional interpretation emerge from context-sensitive
judgments regarding particular cases).
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (refusing to hear a challenge to Virginia’s antimiscegenation
statute).
8. For further discussion of Brown and Naim, see infra notes 270-271, 283, 287-290 and
accompanying text.
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especially in the last two decades. The judicial mind naturally gravitates
away from abstractions and toward close encounters with particular
cases. Even in constitutional law, judges tend to use abstractions only to
the extent necessary to resolve a controversy.9

Professor Sunstein agrees, therefore, that constitutional theory should
play close attention to the Justices’ actual behavior in deciding cases.
At the same time, however, Professor Sunstein appears to let his
own theory — minimalism — unduly color his understanding of what
the Court has actually decided. An occasional qualification
notwithstanding, he fails to register that the Rehnquist Court has
tended to alter its role depending on the circumstances. Instead,
Professor Sunstein maintains that the current Court does not resolve
controversial cases broadly and deeply based on a comprehensive
vision of the Constitution or area of law in question. Rather, he has
argued in academic writing and in the New York Times that most of
the current Justices are “minimalists”10 in the time-honored tradition
of Justice Felix Frankfurter11 and his former law clerk, Professor
Alexander Bickel.12 Minimalists “say no more than necessary,”
Professor Sunstein urges, “resolv[ing] the largest issues of the day . . .
as narrowly as possible,” and requiring “[a]bove all . . . procedures
that are lawful, proper and fair.”13
In an earlier book that sets out his theory of judicial minimalism,
Professor Sunstein describes the practice this way:
A minimalist court settles the case before it, but it leaves many things
undecided. It is alert to the existence of reasonable disagreement in a

9. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT xi (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME].
10. Id. at 9 (stating that Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
“embrace minimalism — usually, not always — for reasons connected with their conception
of the role of the Supreme Court in American government”); Cass R. Sunstein, Op-Ed, The
Smallest Court in the Land, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2004, § 4 (Week in Review), at 9 [hereinafter
Sunstein, The Smallest Court]. In the preface to his book, Professor Sunstein describes
Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer as minimalists. SUNSTEIN, ONE
CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at xiii. Most likely, the discrepancy between the assertion in
the preface and on page 9 is inadvertent, so that Professor Sunstein believes six of the nine
current Justices are minimalists.
11. According to Professor Sunstein:
[Minimalism’s] credo was set out by Justice Felix Frankfurter some 60 years ago, in a case
involving three men who were detained for 14 hours and questioned over two days before
confessing to the murder of a federal officer. In reversing their conviction because they were
deprived of their rights to be brought before judicial authorities, Justice Frankfurter wrote:
“The history of liberty has largely been the history of the [sic] observance of procedural
safeguards.”

Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10 (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332,
347 (1943)).
12. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
13. Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10.
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heterogeneous society. It knows that there is much that it does not know;
it is intensely aware of its own limitations. It seeks to decide cases on
narrow grounds. It avoids clear rules and final resolutions. Alert to the
problem of unanticipated consequences, it sees itself as part of a system
of democratic deliberation; it attempts to promote the democratic ideals
of participation, deliberation, and responsiveness. It allows continued
space for democratic reflection from Congress and the states. It wants to
accommodate new judgments about facts and values. To the extent that
it can, it seeks to provide rulings that can attract support from people
with diverse theoretical commitments.14

Professor Sunstein further explains that “the practice of minimalism
involves two principal features, narrowness and shallowness.”15 Along
the dimension of breadth, minimalist Justices endeavor to decide the
specific case before them rather than lay down broad rules that
effectively decide a host of distinct, future cases. Along the dimension
of depth, minimalists try to avoid unnecessary theoretical ascents,
thereby enabling people who diverge on questions of basic principle to
come together and agree on judicial resolutions in particular cases.16
Professor Sunstein’s theory of judicial minimalism has both
descriptive and prescriptive components. He contends that “[t]he
current Supreme Court embraces minimalism,”17 and he regards this
state of affairs as providing cause for celebration. For example,
Professor Sunstein devotes roughly half of One Case at a Time to
demonstrating — and approving — the Rehnquist Court’s
commitment to minimalism in navigating the legal controversies over
physician-assisted suicide, affirmative action, discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation, same-sex education, and the First
Amendment and new communications technologies.18 Moreover, he
asserts approvingly that the Court’s October 2003 Term exemplifies
his theory of judicial minimalism. He maintains that “minimalism
emerged triumphant” and “was the defining theme of the court’s most
eagerly anticipated cases” that Term.19 Moving from purported
description to prescription, he further submits that, “with its insistent
focus on procedural safeguards, minimalism has real attractions,
perhaps above all in a period in which judges are forced to reconcile
the demands of national security with the commitment to liberty.”20
Professor Sunstein portrays his descriptive and prescriptive claims as

14. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at ix-x.
15. Id. at 10.
16. Id. at 10-11.
17. Id. at xi.
18. Id. at 75-205.
19. Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10.
20. Id.
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complementary, each prefaced on the existence of a relatively clear
definition of minimalism that is capable of uncontroversial
application.21
Those appearances, this Article submits, are illusory. The analysis
that follows demonstrates a deep tension between Professor Sunstein’s
aspiration that minimalism serve as an empirically testable (and
therefore descriptively accurate) account of the Supreme Court’s
work, and his ambition that minimalism provide a convincing
normative theory of judicial review.22 I begin by inquiring whether
judicial minimalism accurately describes many of the most important
decisions from the October 2003 Term. In order to investigate that
question, however, I must give minimalism an operational definition
that is empirically falsifiable. Part I derives, from among the
possibilities evident in Professor Sunstein’s descriptions, a definition
focusing on the narrowness and shallowness of judicial decisions. This
is the only version of minimalism that does not incorporate criteria so
vague and contestable as to render the theory nonfalsifiable and thus
empirically useless. Part II demonstrates that, so understood, the
theory cannot account for many of the Court’s most significant rulings
from the October 2003 Term. Part III shows that the version of
judicial minimalism most susceptible to empirical testing has little
attraction as a normative account of how the Court should resolve
constitutional controversies.
A brief conclusion summarizes the results of the Article’s
empirical and normative analyses, as well as identifies some
rehabilitative options potentially left open to judicial minimalism
going forward. One alternative is to articulate and attempt to test
more modest descriptive claims about the Supreme Court’s
decisionmaking. Another is to abandon minimalism’s claim to serve as
a comprehensive approach to judicial review, and instead to embrace a
contextually justified apprehension of the valuable lessons of
prudence that historically have animated constitutional theories
evoking the work of Alexander Bickel. Those powerful themes are
present in Professor Sunstein’s work.

21. Lest I be suspected of having set up a straw man, it is important to underscore that
Professor Sunstein offers judicial minimalism as a descriptive and normative account of the
Supreme Court’s exercise of judicial review. He does not present minimalism merely as a
general juridical value, virtue, or lesson such as “gradualism,” “judicial restraint,” or
“prudence.”
22. Most of the analysis that follows focuses on the Supreme Court because that is
where Professor Sunstein directs his theory of judicial minimalism. For discussion of his
theory’s implications for lower courts, see infra Section III.A and accompanying text. I do
not mean to suggest that constitutional theory should concentrate its attention almost
exclusively on the Supreme Court.
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OPERATIONALIZING MINIMALISM
A. What is Minimalism?

One cannot evaluate Professor Sunstein’s claim that a majority of
the current Justices are “minimalists”23 without first understanding
with precision what he means when he uses that term. Nor can one
assess minimalism’s value as an approach to constitutional
adjudication without clearly comprehending what minimalism is. A
purportedly empirical theory’s usefulness is severely limited if its
definitional criteria are so inconsistently conceived or radically
indeterminate that the theory is not falsifiable. This point may seem
obvious, but “[f]amiliarity breeds inattention,”24 and Professor
Sunstein is, in fact, notoriously ambiguous about what he means by
“minimalism.” His theory is conceptually unstable.
At some points in Professor Sunstein’s exposition, minimalism
appears to be a theory of the Supreme Court’s institutional position.
He writes that “the denial of certiorari can be analyzed as a form of
minimalism.”25 “Perhaps,” he suggests, “the Court wants to receive
more information, is so divided that it could not resolve the case in
any event, or is attuned to strategic considerations stemming from the
likelihood of adverse public reactions. For all these reasons, it may be
prudent to wait.”26 At other points, however, Professor Sunstein
presents minimalism as a theory of judicial decisionmaking (that is,
how the Justices should draft opinions).27 As noted above,28 he writes
that “the practice of minimalism involves two principal features,
narrowness and shallowness.”29
The theory of the Court’s institutional position is most closely
associated with the scholarship of Alexander Bickel, who focused on
the Court’s role in deciding or not deciding cases.30 Expressed as an

23. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
24. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
18 (1980).
25. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 39.
26. Id.
27. Slippage in the definition of minimalism is apparent throughout One Case at a Time.
Compare, e.g., SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 39 (observing that “the
denial of certiorari can be analyzed as a form of minimalism”), with, e.g., id. at 54 (“If the
Court may deny certiorari partly in order to take account of considerations of this kind,
surely it can use minimalism for the same purpose.”).
28. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
29. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 10.
30. Professor Bickel viewed himself as negotiating, on the Court’s behalf, the same
tension between principle and pragmatism that President Lincoln’s struggle with the issue of
slavery has come to symbolize. BICKEL, supra note 12, at 65-72 (discussing the “Lincolnian
Tension”). Professor Bickel presented the passive virtues not only to make judicial review
safe for majoritarianism, but also as a shield to preserve the Court’s finite institutional
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institutional account, minimalism appears to be a generalization of the
Bickelian theory of the passive virtues, addressing not only the
question “when” the Court should decide certain controversial issues,
but also the question “how.” Indeed, Professor Sunstein writes that
“[i]nsofar as the minimalist judge seeks to promote democratic goals
while recognizing social pluralism, the minimalist project is easily
linked with the idea of ‘passive virtues,’ as discussed by Alexander
Bickel.”31
This spacious account of judicial minimalism evidences the
instability of Professor Sunstein’s conception of the theory. Including
certiorari denials in the definition of minimalism creates an anomaly,
which could be called the paradox of certiorari: almost any Supreme
Court decision cannot be minimalist in simple virtue of the fact that
the Court granted certiorari rather than denying it.32 Professor
Sunstein certainly does not mean to compel that conclusion, for then
his entire discussion of the benefits of narrowness and shallowness
would be beside the point. But logically, his advocacy of narrow and
shallow decisions presupposes a different definition of minimalism
than does his endorsement of the passive virtues.
Insofar as minimalism is conceived as a theory of the Court’s
institutional position, moreover, a disconnect exists between Professor
Sunstein’s aggressive descriptive claim that the Court is minimalist and
the means he employs to validate the assertion. Specifically, he largely
ignores the Court’s certiorari practice, instead concentrating almost all
his attention on about one percent of the Court’s docket — namely,
the eighty or ninety (out of 8,000) cases each Term in which the
Justices grant certiorari.33 His discussion of certiorari denials and the
Court’s certiorari practice more generally, canvassed immediately
above, consumes only a few pages of One Case at a Time.
Professor Sunstein’s approach raises basic questions about
minimalism’s coherence as an account of the Court’s work. What
sense does it make to discuss whether the Justices are minimalists
without considering the overwhelming majority of instances in which

capital in the face of intense political and moral disagreements in American society. Id. at
111-98.
31. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 39. See also id. at 267, n. 5.
32. The Court can choose to deny certiorari almost always. Congress still places a few
categories of cases within the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction — for example, the
campaign finance cases from the October 2003 Term. See infra text accompanying notes 101112.
33. In a typical Term these days, about 8,000 certiorari petitions are filed and around
one percent of them are granted. In the October 2003 Term, for example, 1,722 paid cases
and 6,092 in forma pauperis cases were docketed, for a total of 7,814. Only ninety-one cases,
some of which were consolidated, were argued, submitted, and decided. See Clerk’s Office,
Supreme Court of the United States, Statistical Sheet No. 28 (June 30, 2004) (on file with
author).
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minimalism could potentially be employed simply by declining to
consider cases — that is, through denials of certiorari? Similarly, in
cases in which the Court grants certiorari, it is not obvious why the
purposes of judicial minimalism are implicated in discussions of the
narrowness and shallowness of a given decision but not in the
antecedent question whether (or how) the Court should have granted
certiorari in the first place.34 In other words, Professor Sunstein’s
concentration on the Justices’ written opinions ignores a crucial
dimension of the Supreme Court’s activity, one that should inform
debates about the existence of judicial minimalism insofar as the
theory is proffered as a descriptively accurate account of the Court’s
institutional position.
If one conceives judicial minimalism not as a theory of the Court’s
institutional position, but instead as an account of judicial
decisionmaking once certiorari has been granted, the theory’s
instability endures. Sometimes, minimalism is presented as a theory of
opinion writing that promotes narrow and shallow decisions, rulings
from which certain goods are supposed to flow — namely,
minimization of decision and error costs, enhanced democratic
deliberation, overlapping consensus, and avoidance of deep
theorizing.35 At other times, however, minimalism seems to be a
substantive theory of decisionmaking, one in which minimizing costs
in the tradition of law and economics (broadly conceived),36
implementing the virtues of democratic self-governance in the manner
of modern republican theory,37 and achieving overlapping consensus
following the inspiration of John Rawls38 constitute the
decisionmaking criteria themselves.39 And on still other occasions,

34. See, e.g., infra notes 181-182 and accompanying text (observing that the Supreme
Court sometimes rewrites the questions presented as articulated by the parties or chooses to
review only certain questions presented).
35. See infra Part III (analyzing the various substantive conceptions noted in the text).
To be clear, conceiving minimalism as promoting narrow and shallow decisions does not
entail viewing the attributes of narrowness and shallowness as goods in themselves; rather,
those criteria for decisionmaking constitute means to the end of promoting various other
goods, such as democratic deliberation. On any of its conceptions, minimalism is about
values, not craft-related questions that are pursued for their own sake.
36. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 46 (“Note that we can find such
notions useful without thinking that it is necessary or helpful to understand the idea of
‘costs’ in a fully economistic manner, as if the various consequences of decisions can be
monetized, or aligned along a single metric.”).
37. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539
(1988).
38. See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). See infra Section III.C
for a discussion of Professor Sunstein’s use of Rawlsian political philosophy.
39. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 13-14 (capturing Professor Sunstein’s
vacillations between different conceptions of minimalism).
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minimalism appears to be a substantive theory of rights, one that
stresses the importance of strong procedural protections.40
These are all different accounts of minimalism, and how they relate
to one another theoretically is not clear in Professor Sunstein’s work.
He seems to shift from one to another without explanation, and the
resulting blurriness generates confusion about what the theory of
judicial minimalism is.41 For example, it would seem uncontroversial
that decisions best promoting and protecting democratic deliberation,
such as New York Times v. Sullivan,42 need not be either narrow or
shallow. The same can be said of decisions that protect judicial
procedural rights, such as Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.43 Indeed, both types of
decisions are at war with the notion of minimalism as a theory of
judicial modesty and reservation because in any particular
circumstance they can counsel dramatic results. So where exactly does
minimalism put its chips? The answer is unclear, because Professor
Sunstein situates the normative prong of his theory ambiguously
between a theory of decisionmaking and a substantive theory of rights.
And the situation is made analytically muddier because more than one
theory of decisionmaking appears to be in play.
All these interpretations of judicial minimalism are interesting, and
it is worth pausing to consider what one would have to believe
jurisprudentially to think any of them made sense. Implicitly,
minimalism rejects a hard-edged formalism in which there exists one
“right” answer to a legal question, and it also denies the existence of a
regime characterized by such radical divergence that practitioners
cannot agree on what counts as the minimalist interpretation of a case.
Instead, judicial minimalism presupposes the existence of a relatively
stable community of meaning, one that, by and large, can come to a
rough consensus on which way of deciding a case is the minimalist
option.44

40. See, e.g., supra note 11.
41. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 13 (switching from a focus on narrow and
shallow decisions to an emphasis on procedural safeguards).
42. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that freedom of speech and press bars a civil libel
judgment for criticism of the official conduct of public officials, unless the plaintiff shows
malice by clear and convincing evidence).
43. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (holding in part that due process requires the government to
give a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant a meaningful opportunity to
contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker). For a detailed
discussion of Hamdi, see infra notes 166-169, 208-222, 282-290 and accompanying text.
44. For work clarifying the idea of communities of shared meaning in law, see, for
example, ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 139-60 (1990) and Richard A.
Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the
Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 186-94 (1986-87). For relevant philosophical
background, see generally 1 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (T. McCarthy trans., 1984), and
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Are these jurisprudential assumptions credible? On some level and
to some extent, they are. For example, no one in the speech
community of contemporary constitutional lawyers would suggest that
a narrower option reasonably available to the Supreme Court in a
given case would be to limit its holding to individuals with the same
hair color as the prevailing party. We can all agree that hair color is
completely irrelevant. Of course, that example concerns only the
narrowness/shallowness conception of minimalism, and even on that
interpretation of the theory, it would seem to leave plenty of room for
intense disagreement about the minimalist disposition of a case.
The notion of a stable community of meaning seems incredible
with respect to the other interpretations of judicial minimalism that
are on the table. A Bickelian understanding — call it “prudentialism”
— is impossible to test because the Court almost never explains why at
least six Justices voted to deny certiorari.45 More importantly, even if
explanations were offered, the question whether a given certiorari
denial was prudentialist would itself be endlessly debatable.
Reasonable people inevitably will disagree about whether the Court
should acquire “more information” before intervening, whether the
country is ready for a particular decision, and whether a legal question
is of such urgency and moment that the Court should decide it
regardless of “strategic considerations stemming from the likelihood
of adverse public reactions.”46
Similarly, viewing democratic deliberation, overlapping consensus,
etc., as the criteria for decisionmaking renders effectively impossible
the formation of a consensus on the minimalist interpretation of a
case. Reasonable people inevitably will disagree about what sorts of
judicial decisions are required to promote those goals. The point here
is not that minimalism cannot be falsified as a technical matter, but
rather that the theory no longer has an operational definition that can
actually be tested. Such a conception of minimalism, in other words, is
not empirical but normative, because the question of what will serve
various substantive values is always normatively contestable.
Democracy promotion, for example, is often in the eye of the
beholder. The same reasonable yet irreconcilable disagreement
endures when minimalism is conceived as a substantive theory of
rights.
We are left, therefore, with the view of minimalism that identifies
the narrowness and shallowness of an opinion as the criteria for

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans.,
1958).
45. The affirmative votes of four Justices are required for the Court to grant a petition
for a writ of certiorari.
46 SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 39.
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decision. Professor Sunstein stresses this approach, writing that “the
practice of minimalism involves two principal features, narrowness
and shallowness.”47 While this conception has its problems, they are
probably not as intractable as those associated with the other
interpretations of minimalism canvassed above.48 That is because there
likely exists greater agreement within the speech community of
contemporary constitutional lawyers regarding what constitutes the
narrowest and shallowest resolution of a case than there is regarding
which decision is most conducive to democratic deliberation,
overlapping consensus, etc. Regardless of whether an analysis of
breadth and depth is ultimately credible, in other words, it seems less
incredible than the alternatives, and it may be the best we can do in a
post-Realist world.
Insofar as minimalism can be given an operational definition that is
capable of disconfirmation, Professor Sunstein’s descriptive claim that
the Supreme Court embraces judicial minimalism provides an
interesting empirical proposition. In the following test of his assertion,
I investigate an account of minimalism that focuses on judicial opinion
writing and that enables minimalism to be both a normative and
empirical theory. In the next section, I give operational meaning to
minimalism by defining it as a theory of judicial decisionmaking that
promotes narrow and shallow opinions because of various goods that
are alleged to flow from such rulings.49

47. Id. at 10.
48. There is truth — but also overstatement — in Jeffrey Rosen’s assertion that
“[w]hether a decision is characterized as narrow or shallow, or deep or broad, seems entirely
in the eye of the beholder. . . . The indeterminacy of Sunstein’s categories calls their broader
utility into question.” Jeffrey R. Rosen, The Age of Mixed Results, NEW REPUBLIC, June 28,
1999, at 43-44. Among modern practitioners, moreover, there likely exists less agreement
regarding whether a case was decided “narrowly” than there is concerning whether it was
decided “as narrowly as reasonably possible.” The question whether a holding is narrow is
inescapably relative. By contrast, the question whether a case was decided as narrowly as
reasonably possible invites a more tractable debate over the reasonableness of further
narrowing.
49. I do not mean to suggest that empirical falsifiability is a necessary condition of a
satisfactory constitutional theory. On the contrary, there is a central place for normative
legal theory that is not falsifiable. Indeed, much constitutional jurisprudence involves
training one’s attention on important precedents and gleaning the lessons of principle and
prudence they offer. Positivists in the social sciences take exception to such an approach
because it does not permit prediction and its lessons are not falsifiable. But that does not
mean nonfalsifiable normative theory is not valuable, even necessary, given the nature of the
enterprise of understanding the practice of constitutional adjudication. This Article focuses
in part on the issue of empirical verification because Professor Sunstein makes aggressive
descriptive claims.
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A (Relatively) Falsifiable Definition of Minimalism

In One Case at a Time, Professor Sunstein defines the phrase
“decisional minimalism,” which he uses interchangeably with the
words “judicial minimalism” and “minimalism,” as “the phenomenon
of saying no more than necessary to justify an outcome, and leaving as
much as possible undecided.”50 Minimalists “say no more than
necessary,” Professor Sunstein has reiterated, “resolv[ing] the largest
issues of the day . . . as narrowly as possible,” and requiring “[a]bove
all . . . procedures that are lawful, proper and fair.”51 Practitioners of
judicial minimalism, he submits, decide the case before them, but they
resolve the action as narrowly and shallowly as possible.
According to this operational definition, therefore, minimalism is
not conceived merely as leaving questions undecided. If that were the
definition, then every case would be minimalist in the trivial sense that
reflects the nature of appellate litigation: some issues are presented
and others are not. In other words, it is not helpful to suggest that a
Supreme Court decision is minimalist if it leaves questions
unanswered because all cases leave some questions open. Nor does it
appear useful to submit that a decision is minimalist if it is decided on
jurisdictional grounds rather than on the merits. Jurisdictional rulings
can be very broad in both their scope and impact.52 Finally, it seems a
deviation from the operational definition of minimalism to identify a
holding as minimalist just because the Court decides the only question
before it, leaving other issues unresolved. In that circumstance, it
would be not only misleading, but also incorrect, to say that the Court
resolved the case “as narrowly as possible.” With only one question
before the Court, it could just as readily be said that the Justices
disposed of the matter as broadly as possible.53
Rather, to be minimalist according to the operational definition, a
decision must have two components: it must (a) result from the
(apparently) intentional choice by a majority of the Justices (b) to
decide a case on the narrowest and shallowest grounds reasonably
open to them, even though broader and deeper rationale(s) were
reasonably available. To say the same thing a slightly different way, a
50. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 3-4.
51. Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10.
52. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (holding that a plaintiff in
a civil rights action who had been subjected to a chokehold by the police after a routine
traffic stop lacked standing to seek injunctive relief that would have forbidden future use of
chokeholds because he could not show he was likely to be subjected to them again).
53. It also would be inaccurate to describe as minimalist a decision whose limited scope
is attributable to the lack of a majority opinion. In that scenario, the opinion’s narrowness
and shallowness seem more a function of necessity than choice. In any event, a fractured
Court is not what Professor Sunstein has in mind in describing and defending minimalism. If
it were, he would have underscored that point in One Case at a Time.

SIEGEL 5.DOC

1964

7/11/2005 8:17 AM

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 103:1951

decision is minimalist if and only if at least five Justices had reasonably
available a broader and deeper result, but consciously (as best one can
tell) decided the case as narrowly and shallowly as reasonably
possible.54 It follows from this definition that a decision cannot be
minimalist if no broader and deeper options were reasonably available
to the Court. And when broader and deeper options were reasonably
available, a decision still is not minimalist if narrower and shallower
alternatives were reasonably available as well.55 If no broader and
deeper option was reasonably open to the Court, therefore, Professor
Sunstein cannot establish that a given decision is minimalist. If
narrower and shallower alternatives were reasonably available to the
Justices, moreover, it can be affirmatively shown that a decision is not
minimalist.56
To be clear, these demanding requirements are not the proximate
result of an uncharitable reading of Professor Sunstein’s work. On the
contrary, they are logical entailments of Professor Sunstein’s own
aggressive and provocative submissions that the Rehnquist Court is
minimalist and minimalists decide cases as narrowly and shallowly as
possible.57 One key question this inquiry will investigate is the extent
54. It would be possible to define minimalism without requiring that it entail a conscious
choice — that is, the practice could be defined as rendering the narrowest and shallowest
decision possible when broader and deeper alternatives are available. Minimalism would
then be a way of categorizing opinions. But that approach does not accurately reflect
Professor Sunstein’s argument. He is focusing on minimalism as an option that courts do and
should make. This understanding reflects minimalism as a conscious choice.
55. The repeated references to reasonableness in the text seek to exclude exercises in
further narrowing that most, if not all, members of the speech community of contemporary
constitutional lawyers would regard as unavailable — for example, limiting the holding of a
case to persons with the hair color of the prevailing party.
56. It might be profitable to examine more deeply the adequacy of this definition of
judicial minimalism. For example, the attribute of shallowness may not be as important as
that of narrowness in properly conceiving minimalism; the issue of shallowness may have
more to do with the extent of one’s agreement with a court’s reasoning than with the optimal
level of theoretical depth. Indeed, Professor Sunstein may have implicitly, if unwittingly,
acknowledged that narrowness is more important than shallowness in identifying minimalist
decisionmaking. He sometimes drops shallowness as a criterion in his description of
minimalism. See supra text accompanying note 13. Moreover, he types Chief Justice
Rehnquist as more nonminimalist than minimalist, see SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME,
supra note 9, at xiii, yet the Chief Justice’s opinions are characteristically shallow in the
sense that their underlying rationales are not readily available. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 124
S. Ct. 1307 (2004); infra notes 126-134 and accompanying text (discussing Locke v. Davey);
see also infra note 162 and accompanying text (identifying another instance in which the
Chief Justice provides no explanation for a nonobvious conclusion). In any event, the
interesting question of narrowness versus shallowness is beyond the scope of this inquiry. I
am content to stick with what I perceive to be the most operational understanding of
minimalism in Professor Sunstein’s work, and to investigate the phenomenon’s positive and
normative power.
57. See, e.g., text accompanying note 13; see also SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra
note 9, at 3-4 (“Let us describe the phenomenon of saying no more than necessary to justify
an outcome, and leaving as much as possible undecided, as ‘decisional minimalism.’”)
(emphases added).
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to which Professor Sunstein has seriously overclaimed. Even if he has,
however, it is worth underscoring that a respectable minimalism of
relative narrowness and shallowness, both empirically and
normatively, may still be possible. I will return to that issue in the
Conclusion of this Article.
Note one implication of the notion of deciding a case as narrowly
and shallowly as reasonably possible. The minimalist inquiry takes as
it finds them the Court’s dispositions of cases — that is, the majority’s
decision whether to affirm or reverse the judgment of the court below.
Minimalism addresses only how those decisions are crafted in terms of
narrowness and shallowness. A distinct way of proceeding would be to
direct the Justices to begin with the goal of narrowness and
shallowness and then to choose dispositions that are the least broad
and deep. Although it is possible to read Professor Sunstein both
ways, the operational definition reflects the former understanding
because it is doubtful Professor Sunstein means to require the Justices
not to act on their considered constitutional judgments about who
should win and who should lose a given case. In the empirical analysis
that follows, therefore, it is no argument against minimalism that the
dissent’s approach was narrower and shallower than the majority’s.
Another dimension of the operational definition of minimalism is
worth underscoring from the start: the reasons motivating a decision
are not relevant in assessing whether a decision is minimalist. Reasons
for action, therefore, will not play a prominent role in the following
empirical analysis of Rehnquist Court decisionmaking. What matters
to the operational view of minimalism is the degree of narrowness and
shallowness that the Justices chose relative to the available
alternatives, not the question why the Court decided a case in a
particular way. The reason could be that the Justices, like Professor
Sunstein, care about deliberative democracy and negotiating deep
moral disagreements. But the reason could also be the need to count
to five and form a Court. Without some story to the effect that
ideological and methodological differences within the Court faithfully
reflect the moral and cultural diversity across American society as a
whole, compromising on principle to get along with one’s colleagues
would seem to have little to do with the democratic values minimalism
seeks to promote.
Accordingly, the presence of a minimalist opinion provides no
indication that the Justices share the theory’s democratic project. I
emphasize this point for a reason. In stating that “[t]he current
Supreme Court embraces minimalism,”58 Professor Sunstein appears
to suggest not only that the Justices render the narrowest and
shallowest decisions reasonably possible, but also that they are

58. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at xi.
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motivated by minimalist substantive values.59 That motivational
assertion is largely nonfalsifiable. The Court does not reveal its
internal deliberations, nor is a minimalist motivation evident on the
face of most opinions. Only years from the time a decision comes
down, when the private papers of then-current Justices are made
public, may scholars and other Court watchers have any chance of
learning as a general matter whether the Justices who joined
minimalist opinions were motivated by minimalism.60
One final point about the operational conception of minimalism is
worth stressing before turning to the cases. One cannot determine
whether a judicial decision is minimalist by assessing its real-world
effects. While minimalist opinions may tend to have less impact than
nonminimalist decisions as a general matter, that need not always be
the case. Narrow and shallow decisions can have huge impacts, and
broad and deep decisions can cause relatively modest effects. Baker v.
Carr held only that malapportionment challenges are justiciable, but
the legal and social consequences were enormous.61 And the Court’s
more recent anticommandeering decisions were relatively broad and
deep, but the effects of that principle have been quite modest.62 The
narrowness/shallowness inquiry is analytically distinct from an
investigation of social consequences.
II. THE REHNQUIST COURT’S RECENT RECORD
With the operational definition of minimalism in hand, it is now
possible to evaluate Professor Sunstein’s provocative descriptive claim
that the current Court embraces his theory. In this regard, one
important issue to consider is the consistency between his definition of
minimalism and the decisions he identifies as minimalist. Another
significant question, with which I begin, is the optimal sample size
from which to draw general conclusions about the jurisprudential
nature of this Court’s work.

59. See id. at 9 (asserting that Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer “have chosen to be minimalist for reasons that are, broadly speaking, of the sort I will
be discussing here” (emphasis added)).
60. The Justices’ academic writings and public addresses might provide general evidence
of a minimalist judicial philosophy. To my knowledge, however, none of them has expressed
a minimalist motivation in such settings.
61. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
62. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress may not
“commandeer” local sheriffs by requiring them to perform background checks on would-be
handgun purchasers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that a federal
statute requiring states either to regulate radioactive waste or to take title to the waste
constitutes unconstitutional compulsion and commandeering of the states’ governmental
capacity).
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In considering the descriptive accuracy of Professor Sunstein’s
claim that the Rehnquist Court embraces minimalism, a
methodological question that immediately arises is how best to
proceed. If one takes as the proper time frame a roughly twenty-year
period, the sheer number of decisions involved renders detailed
analysis difficult to conduct. Moreover, one runs the risk of being
selective in choosing which cases to analyze. It appears likely that a
number of decisions from the past two decades are minimalist, and
that a number are not.
In light of those difficulties, one appropriate way to assess a
theorist’s descriptive thesis is to focus on a sufficiently short time
period such that the evaluative problem is rendered both analytically
tractable and susceptible to evenhanded analysis. Regarding Professor
Sunstein’s theory in particular, it seems appropriate to examine closely
the constitutional cases from the Court’s October 2003 Term because
he himself has implied that the Justices’ work during that year
validates his theory.63 Below I analyze the decisions he discusses from
that Term after first applying the operational definition of minimalism
to several significant holdings he overlooks.64
A. Decisions Overlooked
1.

Blakely and Crawford

Professor Sunstein makes no mention of the Court’s jaw-dropping
holding in Blakely v. Washington.65 Although overshadowed by more
high-profile cases, Blakely may end up being the year’s most
momentous decision in terms of concrete human consequences. The
Court there struck down a state sentencing-guidelines regime on
grounds that jeopardized the constitutionality of numerous other state
sentencing systems and led to the partial invalidation — and
fundamental reshaping — of the United States Sentencing

63. Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10.
64. To be clear, I focus on the constitutional cases from the October 2003 Term,
including those that were not ultimately decided on constitutional grounds. I do not analyze
the several cases in which the Court decided important questions of federal statutory
interpretation. Nor do I discuss most of the criminal procedure decisions. Those regrettable
omissions were necessary to keep this Article’s length manageable. For a more
comprehensive overview of the term, see The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Leading Cases,
118 HARV. L. REV. 248, 248-496 (2004) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
65. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); see, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Blakely’s Federal Aftermath, 16
FED. SENTENCING REP. 333, 333 (2004) (“The media are sometimes slow to recognize
landmark Supreme Court decisions. Even Professor Cass Sunstein praised the current
Justices as ‘minimalists’ who hew to judicial restraint, overlooking the Court’s most earthshaking decision last Term.”). Justice Breyer relied on Professor Bibas’s work in his Blakely
dissent. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2553, 2556-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Stephanos
Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110
YALE L.J. 1097, 1100-01 (2001)).
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Guidelines.66 Specifically, the Court in Blakely held that petitioner
Ralph Howard Blakely’s sentence violated his Sixth Amendment right
to trial by jury because not every fact supporting the sentence was
admitted by him or found by a jury.67 Using a common practice, the
judge ratcheted up Blakely’s sentence from 53 months to 90 months
after finding that he had acted with “deliberate cruelty,” a statutory
ground for departing upward from the standard sentencing range.68
The result was that two decades of sentencing reform and tens of
thousands of criminal sentences were put in jeopardy, which is why
lawyers and judges around the country scrambled to understand the
decision’s breadth and to choose a sensible response. Justice
O’Connor, who does not often exaggerate for rhetorical effect, wrote
in dissent that “the practical consequences of today’s decision may be
disastrous.”69 The Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits struck down the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in light of
Blakely,70 and the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits reaffirmed the Guidelines’ validity.71 With the situation in the
lower courts still very much in flux,72 the Supreme Court, at the urgent
request of then-Acting Solicitor General Paul D. Clement during the

66. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment as interpreted in Blakely applies to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and that
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 must be modified so as to render the Guidelines
effectively advisory, requiring a sentencing court to consider Guidelines ranges but
permitting it to tailor the sentence in view of other statutory concerns).
67. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536-43.
68. Id. at 2535.
69. Id. at 2544.
70. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, No. 04-104 (Aug.
2, 2004); United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2004).
71. United States v. Warren, 120 Fed. Appx. 257 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Mincey, 380 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam); United States v. Hammoud, 378 F.3d 426
(4th Cir. 2004) (en banc); United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Koch, 383 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc); United States v. Reese, 382 F.3d 1308
(11th Cir. 2004).
72. Legal blogs on the Internet reported the judicial action blow by blow. See, e.g.,
Howard J. Bashman, How Appealing, at http://legalaffairs.org/howappealing (visited
throughout Summer 2004); Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing Law and Policy, at
http://sentencing.typepad.com. Dahlia Lithwick, in her inimitable way, observed:
For the first time in recent memory, the wheels of justice are turning faster than the news
cycle. The fallout from the term’s sleeper case, Blakely v. Washington, grows more dramatic
by the hour. And the best image I can conjure to describe the situation involves all the
federal court judges in America racing around with plastic bags, trying madly to dispose of
the Supreme Court’s droppings.

Dahlia Lithwick, No-Good Lazy Justices: After the Supreme Court’s sentencing case, the sky
is falling. Hooray!, SLATE, July 15, 2004, at http://slate.msn.com/id/2103909. I had to revise
the paragraph in the text describing the developments in the circuits several times, as each
new decision rendered the previous day’s summary out of date.
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Court’s Summer 2004 recess,73 granted certiorari in two cases to
resolve the circuit split and restore uniformity to federal criminal
sentencing law.74 The Court heard oral argument on Monday, October
4, the first day of the new Term, in a very rare afternoon session.75
Booker and Fanfan came down on January 12, 2005. In an unusual
decision, the Court issued two separate majority opinions. The first
concluded that the current approach to applying the Sentencing
Guidelines was unconstitutional, and the second prescribed the
remedy for this constitutional problem. Justice Stevens, joined by
Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, held that Blakely
applies to the Sentencing Guidelines. Justice Stevens stressed that the
Guidelines compelled the judge to impose a sentence greater than that
which would be based on the jury’s verdict; he concluded that this
requirement conflicts with Blakely’s holding that any factor (other
than the fact of a prior conviction) leading to a sentence greater than
that which would be imposed based on the jury’s verdict must be
proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.76 Regarding the
appropriate remedy for the constitutional violation, however, Justice
Breyer wrote for the Court, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg.77 Justice Breyer
concluded that the proper remedy, in light of the congressional intent
underlying the Sentencing Reform Act, was to make the Guidelines
advisory rather than mandatory — that the Guidelines’ mandatory
nature rendered them unconstitutional.78 He concluded that federal
courts of appeals should review sentences to determine whether they
are reasonable.79
Because Blakely triggered this extraordinary series of events, the
notion that it was a minimalist decision may seem counterintuitive.

73. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Solicitor General, October Term 2004
Briefs Petitions and Replies, at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2004/2pet/7pet/20040104.pet.aa.html, http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2004/2pet/7pet/2004-0105.pet.aa.html (last
visited August 3, 2004).
74. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 11
(2004); Fanfan v. United States, No. 03-47, 2004 WL 1723114 (D. Me. Jun 28, 2004), cert.
granted before judgment, 125 S. Ct. 11 (2004).
75. Supreme Court of the United States, Argument Calendar: October Term 2004, at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_calendars/monthlyargumentcaloc
tober2004.pdf (last visited Aug. 3, 2004).
76. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 748-52 (2005).
77. In other words, Justice Ginsburg joined the four dissenters to Justice Stevens’
opinion — the dissenters in Blakely — on the issue of the appropriate remedy.
78. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 757-69. Justice Breyer expressly disagreed with the dissent’s
view that the jury should find the requisite facts for greater sentences under the Guidelines.
Justice Breyer perceived no basis for the Court’s interjecting the jury into the sentencing
system created by Congress under the Sentencing Reform Act. Id.
79. Id. at 765-67.
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Yet it is worth recalling that minimalist decisions may have a
significant real-world impact.80 It might be technically accurate,
therefore, to describe the Court’s ruling in Blakely as minimalist.81 A
defender of judicial minimalism who turned her attention to Blakely
might suggest that the decision represents minimalism par excellence.
After all, the Court expressly declined to decide the validity of the
Federal Guidelines,82 instead choosing to proceed “one case at a
time.”83
Such a defender of minimalism, however, cannot rely on the
Federal Guidelines question left open in Blakely to show that broader
and deeper options were reasonably available to the Court. The
Justices could not have decided Blakely more broadly and deeply for
the simple reason that the constitutionality of the Guidelines was not
before the Court. The cold, hard reality of judicial review is that the
Justices can — in the sense of raw power to act — say whatever they
want. But that cannot be the criterion for determining whether a
decision is minimalist if one wants to avoid the trivial conclusion that
every judicial decision lacks breadth in this sense. Rather, the relevant
question is whether the Court reasonably could have decided the
Guidelines issue in Blakely. I do not see how it could have.84
80. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
81. Indeed, looking back now in the wake of Blakely and Booker, Jeffrey Rosen was
prescient in his assessment of One Case at a Time:
If the Supreme Court were the only court in the nation, it might be able to embrace a
highly personalized, “the law is what we say it is” jurisprudence, without worrying about
giving very clear reasons for why it is doing so, and without tipping its hand about how it is
likely to decide similar cases in the future. In the American system, however, the Supreme
Court sits at the top of a pyramid of inferior federal courts, all of which are bound to apply
its decisions uniformly throughout the nation. And lower courts, when faced with a narrow,
shallow Supreme Court decision of the kind that Sunstein praises, may literally be at a loss
about what the opinion means. This is more likely to promote chaos than reasoned
deliberation.

Rosen, supra note 48, at 45.
82. Justice Scalia authored this terse, poker-faced statement for the Court: “The Federal
Guidelines are not before us, and we express no opinion on them.” Blakely v. Washington,
124 S. Ct. 2531, 2538 n.9 (2004). Justice Scalia declined to engage Justice Breyer’s strong
disagreement with the Court’s approach:
Ordinarily, this Court simply waits for cases to arise in which it can answer such questions.
But this case affects tens of thousands of criminal prosecutions, including federal
prosecutions. Federal prosecutors will proceed with those prosecutions subject to the risk
that all defendants in those cases will have to be sentenced, perhaps tried, anew. Given this
consequence and the need for certainty, I would not proceed further piecemeal; rather, I
would call for further argument on the ramifications of the concerns I have raised. But that
is not the Court’s view.

Id. at 2562 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
83. Lithwick, for example, praised the Blakely decision because the Court “did precisely
what everyone keeps asking courts to do and showed impressive restraint.” Lithwick, supra
note 72.
84. This is not to suggest that the Court had no alternative but to proceed in the way it
did. The Court could have granted certiorari in Blakely along with one of the many petitions

SIEGEL 5.DOC

August 2005]

7/11/2005 8:17 AM

A Theory in Search of a Court

1971

The Court, moreover, reasonably could have resolved Blakely
more narrowly and shallowly than it did. The part of the opinion that
has received the most attention is Justice Scalia’s explanation of why
the maximum sentence Blakely could have received was 53 months,
not 90:
Our precedents make clear . . . that the “statutory maximum” for
Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely
on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant. In other words, the relevant “statutory maximum” is not the
maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but
the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. When a
judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the
jury has not found all the facts “which the law makes essential to the
punishment,” and the judge exceeds his proper authority.
The judge in this case could not have imposed the exceptional 90month sentence solely on the basis of the facts admitted in the guilty
plea. . . . Had the judge imposed the 90-month sentence solely on the
basis of the plea, he would have been reversed. The “maximum
sentence” is no more 10 years here than it was 20 years in Apprendi
(because that is what the judge could have imposed upon finding a hate
crime) or death in Ring (because that is what the judge could have
imposed upon finding an aggravator).85

In order to resolve the case, the Court did not need to distinguish
between judicial and jury fact findings at such a general level of
abstraction. Instead, the Justices could have rendered a more
factbound decision, that is, one limited to judicial findings similar to
that of “deliberate cruelty” at issue in the case. Indeed, in light of the
demanding mens rea requirement implicit in the word “deliberate,”
the particular factual determination at issue in Blakely was indicative
of a separate crime. The Court could have held only that the State’s
scheme was unconstitutional as far as such facts are concerned.
The intuition behind the Court’s broad holdings in Apprendi v.
New Jersey86 and Blakely appears to be that it is unconstitutional to
convict someone of one crime and then to sentence him to a different,
more serious crime.87 Justice Scalia is right that it can be difficult to

seeking to challenge the Federal Guidelines that routinely are pending before the Court; the
Justices then could have considered both questions together. Alternatively, the Court could
have delayed ruling in Blakely and granted certiorari in a Federal Guidelines case once the
implications of the Court’s holding in Blakely had become clearer to the Justices. The Court
also could have followed Justice Breyer’s advice. See supra note 82.
85. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537-38 (2004) (citations and footnote omitted).
86. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”).
87. I credit Erwin Chemerinsky with having articulated that intuitive understanding of
Apprendi and Blakely’s essential meaning.
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sort out the point at which the “tail” begins to “wag” the “dog.”88 But
he cannot reasonably deny that some cases are easier than others in
this regard. Nor can he establish that the Court was somehow required
to decide all such cases arising under Washington law at once.
The minimalist approach I suggest above, it could be argued, might
have required the Court to make distinctions without an ultimately
persuasive difference after several more cases were litigated at the
Supreme Court. But is not that result what narrowness and
shallowness are sometimes all about? Moreover, it would not have
been the first time that the Court distinguished different kinds of facts
in this complicated, changing area of the law.89 The Court’s decision in
Blakely is not a shining moment for minimalism.
As discussed above in Part I, there exists an important distinction
between deciding questions narrowly and shallowly, and leaving issues
undecided. Blockbuster decisions such as Blakely, by virtue of their
very breadth or depth, change the law significantly and thus
necessarily create — as opposed to leave open — serious questions
where none previously existed.90 It is incorrect, therefore, to equate
unanswered questions with minimalism or to assume that the existence
of unanswered questions reflects the practice of minimalism. Thus, not
only would it be counterintuitive to describe the Court’s decision in
Blakely as minimalist, but attempting to support that assertion would
also require twisting the only available operational definition of
minimalism.91
88. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2542 n.13 (“To be sure, Justice Breyer and the other
dissenters would forbid those increases of sentence that violate the constitutional principle
that tail shall not wag dog. The source of this principle is entirely unclear. Its precise effect, if
precise effect it has, is presumably to require that the ratio of sentencing-factor add-on to
basic criminal sentence be no greater than the ratio of caudal vertebrae to body in the breed
of canine with the longest tail. Or perhaps no greater than the average such ratio for all
breeds. Or perhaps the median. Regrettably, Apprendi has prevented full development of
this line of jurisprudence.”).
89. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (declining to overrule Almendarez-Torres v. United
States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), in excluding “the fact of a prior conviction” from the coverage of
its holding).
90. As Part I also mentioned, the Justices may leave questions unanswered because a
majority cannot agree on a rationale to support the judgment, as in the political
gerrymandering case decided during the October 2003 Term. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S.
Ct. 1769 (2004) (affirming without majority opinion the judgment of a three-judge district
court dismissing a political gerrymandering claim).
91. It might be tempting to add that the overwhelming majority of commentators with
relevant expertise believed, even before Booker came down, that the Federal Guidelines
could not plausibly be distinguished from the Washington scheme invalidated by the Court
in Blakely. See, e.g., Lithwick, supra note 72 (“The problem, of course, is that most scholars
agree that the most logical inference one can draw from Blakely v. Washington is that
significant portions of the federal guidelines are unconstitutional, too.”). In Blakely, the
Solicitor General almost appeared to concede as much (reading between the lines) in his
amicus brief in support of the State. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, characterized the
Government’s position this way: “The United States, as amicus curiae, urges us to affirm. It
notes differences between Washington’s sentencing regime and the Federal Sentencing
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Professor Sunstein also omits discussion of another historic
decision from the October 2003 Term, Crawford v. Washington.92
Crawford is not the work of a minimalist Court. The Justices there
changed the law of evidence in every criminal court in the United
States regarding the Sixth Amendment’s requirement of confrontation
with respect to testimonial hearsay,93 overruling a twenty-four-yearold precedent, Ohio v. Roberts.94 The Court in Crawford held that
“[w]here testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of
reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the
Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”95
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O’Connor, “dissent[ed]
from the Court’s decision to overrule [Roberts].”96 His dissent rejects a
minimalist interpretation of the majority opinion:
[T]he Court’s adoption of a new interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause is not backed by sufficiently persuasive reasoning to overrule
long-established precedent. Its decision casts a mantle of uncertainty
over future criminal trials in both federal and state courts, and is by no
means necessary to decide the present case.97

According to the Chief Justice,98 reversal of the state supreme court’s
judgment was amply supported by that tribunal’s contravention of the
holding of Idaho v. Wright, a case in which the Court concluded that
an out-of-court statement was not admissible simply because its
truthfulness was corroborated by other evidence at trial.99 In the Chief

Guidelines but questions whether those differences are constitutionally significant.” Blakely,
124 S. Ct. at 2538 n.9. Justice O’Connor expressed a similar understanding of the
Government’s view in her dissent: “The structure of the Federal Guidelines . . . does not, as
the Government half-heartedly suggests, provide any grounds for distinction.” Id. at 2549
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). Accordingly, the Blakely decision lends itself to the charge of
disingenuousness. “The writing is on the wall,” a cynic might have contended just after
Blakely was decided, “and certain courts of appeals already have gotten the message.” On
this view, “one case at a time” really meant “it’s only a matter of time.” Warranted or not,
the disingenuousness critique is not relevant here because it concerns motivational issues
that do not appropriately affect the question whether a given decision is minimalist. See
supra Part I.
92. 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
93. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST.,
amend. VI.
94. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not bar
admission of an unavailable witness’s statement against a criminal defendant if the statement
bears “adequate ‘indicia of reliability,’” a test met when the evidence either falls within a
“firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bears “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness”).
95. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374.
96. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment).
97. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 1378 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment).
99. 497 U.S. 805, 820-24 (1990).
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Justice’s view, the testimonial hearsay at issue in Crawford’s case had
been admitted based on that previously rejected rationale.100
A defender of the claim that the Court’s decision in Crawford is
minimalist might observe that the Justices left open questions
concerning which kinds of statements qualify as testimonial, including
whether dying declarations or excited utterances qualify. But as Part I
and the above discussion of Blakely make clear, asserting that the
Court left questions unanswered does not demonstrate the presence of
minimalism. The Court in Crawford could have resolved the case
narrowly based on precedent; instead, it rendered a remarkably broad
decision.
2.

McConnell and Sabri

Because so many statutory provisions were challenged in the
historic campaign finance decision from the October 2003 Term,
McConnell v. FEC,101 a comprehensive analysis of the Court’s three
separate majority opinions would be inappropriate in this setting.
Instead, I will highlight general evidence of breadth and depth in the
expansive reasoning and language of the Court’s lead opinion.
McConnell
involved
eleven
actions
challenging
the
constitutionality of numerous statutory provisions set forth in the five
titles of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”).102
The Court decisively upheld almost all of BCRA’s most important
provisions, including Title I’s regulation of the use of “soft money” by
political parties, officeholders, and candidates, and Title II’s
prohibition of corporate and labor-union use of general treasury funds
for communications that are intended to, or have the effect of,
influencing the outcome of federal elections.103 Commentators debate
the soundness of the Court’s reasoning, and they dispute whether the
reform effort that culminated in BCRA’s enactment can make a
difference in view of the inevitability of effective evasions. I am aware
of no one on either side of those disputes, however, who views the
Court as having shaped its numerous holdings as narrowly and
shallowly as reasonably possible.
Nor is it apparent what broader and deeper options existed that
the Justices deliberately chose to forego in favor of a minimalist path.

100. See also Leading Cases, supra note 64, at 322 (“[I]f the Court were truly concerned
with avoiding questions it need not reach, it could have simply resolved the entire case with
‘a citation to Idaho v. Wright,’ as Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested.”) (quoting 124 S. Ct. at
1378 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment)).
101. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
102. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2
U.S.C.).
103. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 223-24.
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The Court emphatically and enthusiastically upheld BCRA’s most
important provisions. Indeed, “[e]ven academics who support the
result in McConnell complain that the Court did not apply sufficiently
demanding scrutiny and was overly deferential to Congress in judging
whether BCRA was properly tailored to preventing the corruption or
appearance of corruption claimed to justify the law.”104 One
commentator, for example, observes that “[t]he Court not only upheld
BCRA against constitutional challenge; it lavished it and prior
congressional regulatory efforts with effusive praise as furthering the
needs of a well-functioning democracy.”105 In one instance among
several, the Court’s lead opinion introduced BCRA as “the most
recent federal enactment designed to purge national politics of what
was conceived to be the pernicious influence of ‘big money’ campaign
contributions.”106
In sustaining BCRA’s core provisions, moreover, the Court
displayed an expansive understanding of political “corruption.”
Specifically, the Court conceived corruption broadly to include
contributions that may purchase special access to political influence.107
“By focusing on special access,” one commentator notes, “the Court
shifted from Buckley’s emphasis on the possible effects of money on
actual policymaking to its effects on the opportunity to influence
policymaking or gain special access,” a move that “will make it easier
for courts to uphold contribution caps in various forms.”108 Of course,
not all those “various forms” were before the Court in McConnell; the
breadth of the Court’s conception of corruption thus evidences the
decision’s nonminimalist nature. The Court, moreover, even intimated
that BCRA was justified as a “governmental effort to advance
participation in self-government itself.”109 That is an extraordinarily
broad and deep rationale for validating congressional campaignfinance regulations like BCRA.
104. Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 134 (2004) (citing
Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance
Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31 (2004)).
“[I]n their embrace of legislative deference,” Professor Hasen writes, the Justices “have
abdicated their responsibility to carefully balance competing constitutional concerns and to
police legislatively enacted campaign finance regulations for self-interest.” Hasen, supra, at
60.
105. Hasen, supra note 104, at 59 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 115-18, 206 n.88).
106. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 115 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Id. at 150-51, 156, 174-75 (emphasizing Congress’s interest in limiting special
access).
108. Pildes, supra note 104, at 151-52.
109. Id. at 149 (“Reflecting the present-day democratic disaffection . . . , the Court cast
campaign finance regulation as a response to the ‘cynical assumption that large donors call
the tune’ and the ‘dispiriting’ consequences of that assumption for public participation in
elections and self-government.”) (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143-44, 153).
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In addition, the majority virtually invited further congressional
legislation aimed at eliminating corruption, thereby suggesting that the
Court’s holdings were quite broad and deep:
Many years ago we observed that “[t]o say that Congress is without
power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard . . . an election from
the improper use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation
in a vital particular the power of self-protection.” Burroughs v. United
States, 290 U.S. [534,] 545 [(1934)]. We abide by that conviction in
considering Congress’s most recent effort to confine the ill effects of
aggregated wealth on our political system. We are under no illusion that
BCRA will be the last congressional statement on the matter. Money,
like water, will always find an outlet. What problems will arise, and how
Congress will respond, are concerns for another day.110

Concerns for another day they may be, but on this day the Court was
almost encouraging Congress to continue combating the corrosive
effects of money on the political system. A minimalist Court would
not have been so supportive of Congress’s concerns. By definition, an
invitation to further legislation does not reflect a minimalist approach
to adjudicating constitutional cases — that is, such encouragement
does not exemplify “the phenomenon of saying no more than
necessary to justify an outcome, and leaving as much as possible
undecided.”111
In sum, the Court articulated a robust conception of corruption in
McConnell, one moving it practically to congratulate Congress for its
work and to invite further legislative action. Because “[l]ower courts
showing fidelity to McConnell will have a difficult time striking down
most campaign finance regulation,”112 and because of the reasons for
that difficulty canvassed above, the decision is not fairly viewed as
minimalist.
Sabri v. United States113 does not warrant extended discussion in
this setting because the majority opinion’s unqualified endorsement of
broad federal spending power is manifestly nonminimalist. At issue in
the case was the constitutionality of a federal criminal law, 18 U.S.C.
§ 666(a)(2), which prohibits bribing state and local officials of entities
that receive at least $10,000 in federal funds. The petitioner, a real
estate developer, was arrested and indicted under the statute after
offering bribes to a city councilman in the hopes of obtaining, among
other things, city regulatory approvals.114

110. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 223-24.
111. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 3-4.
112. Hasen, supra note 104, at 72.
113. 124 S. Ct. 1941 (2004).
114. Id. at 1944.
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The Court could have sustained the statute on any number of
relatively narrow grounds. Because of the widely recognized
possibility that Congress could use the spending power to circumvent
the federalism-based limits imposed by the Court on the commerce
power,115 one option was to hold only that § 666(a)(2) falls within
Congress’ authority under the Spending and Necessary and Proper
Clauses because bribery inherently implicates commercial activity.116
Another possibility was to limit the holding to bribery of officials in a
position to impact how federal funds are spent.117 Alternatively, the
Court could have upheld the statute under its existing Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.118 Like the congressional regulation of local
“loan sharking” activities upheld in Perez v. United States,119 bribery of
public officials has a substantial effect on interstate commerce when
considered in the aggregate.120 The commercial nature of bribery also
brings § 666(a)(2) within the commerce power under United States v.
Lopez121 and United States v. Morrison.122
Instead of choosing any of those available paths, the Court
underscored the breadth of federal power to legislate pursuant to the
spending and necessary and proper hooks, holding that Congress may
enact criminal statutes as long as their general prohibitions have some
rational connection to protecting the purposes of federal funding.123
Stressing that “[m]oney is fungible”124 and that the statute addresses
bribery problems at the source “by rational means” 125 is not the work
115. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the
Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could
Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 460 (2003) (noting the “many commentators” who
“have proposed that Congress should respond to the Rehnquist Court’s states’ rights
decisions by using the spending power to circumvent those limitations on congressional
power”).
116. Leading Cases, supra note 64, at 382-83 (noting the narrower option proposed in
the text while articulating Sabri’s breathtaking implications for the values animating the
Court’s federalism jurisprudence).
117. Id. (rejecting the proposal in the text as a plausible interpretation of the Court’s
opinion).
118. Justice Thomas relied on the commerce power to uphold the statute. He took
exception to “the scope the Court gives to the Necessary and Proper Clause as applied to
Congress’ authority to spend.” 124 S. Ct. at 1949 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
119. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
120. Id. at 151-55.
121. 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (stressing that the criminal statute at issue “by its terms
has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one
might define those terms”).
122. 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000) (emphasizing “the role that the economic nature of the
regulated activity plays in our Commerce Clause analysis”).
123. Sabri, 124 S. Ct. at 1946-47.
124. Id. at 1946.
125. Id.
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of a Court concerned to approve narrowly a particular use of the
spending power — let alone approve it as narrowly as reasonably
possible. Under the Court’s reasoning, any official of any entity
receiving any amount of federal funds can be brought within the scope
of federal criminal laws.
3.

Davey and Lane

In fairness, it should be pointed out that the Court may have
rendered a couple of minimalist decisions in important cases during
the October 2003 Term. In Locke v. Davey,126 the Justices considered
Washington State’s Promise Scholarship Program, which had been
created to help academically gifted students pay for college. The state
constitution prohibits students from using a Promise Scholarship to
pursue a devotional theology degree. Respondent Joshua Davey was
awarded such a scholarship and chose pastoral ministries, a devotional
theology degree, as one of his majors. Upon learning he could not use
his scholarship to pursue that degree, Davey sued under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The state-mandated scholarship denial, he argued, violated the
First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause by discriminating against
religion because excluding religious alternatives was not required by
the federal Establishment Clause.127
By a vote of seven to two, the Court rejected Davey’s free exercise
challenge, upholding Washington’s decision to exclude students who
pursue a devotional theology degree from its otherwise-inclusive
scholarship aid program. Writing for the majority, the Chief Justice
arguably limited the Court’s holding to contexts where taxpayer
funding is used to train religious leaders:
The State’s interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees is
substantial and the exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor
burden on Promise Scholars. If any room exists between the two
Religion Clauses, it must be here. We need not venture further into this
difficult area in order to uphold the Promise Scholarship Program as
currently operated by the State of Washington.128

The Court could have gone further by rejecting broadly the notion
that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits excluding religious alternatives
(and only religious alternatives) from state funding programs that the
Establishment Clause allows. That was the breathtaking implication of

126. 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004).
127. Under controlling Supreme Court precedent, Washington was not compelled by
the federal Establishment Clause to exclude devotional degrees from its otherwise inclusive
aid program because the independent and private choices of scholarship recipients sever the
connection between government funding and religious training. See, e.g., Witters v.
Washington Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986).
128. Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1315.
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respondent Joshua Davey’s argument and Justice Scalia’s dissent.129
According to such reasoning, for example, the inclusion of sectarian
private schools (along with secular private schools) in the voucher
program at issue in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris130 became
constitutionally required under the Free Exercise Clause once the
Court held that such inclusion is constitutionally permissible under the
Establishment Clause.
On the other hand, the Chief Justice’s opinion for the Court in
Davey is ambiguous; it is reasonably read expansively as having
rejected the broader rationale just identified:
These two Clauses, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause, are frequently in tension. Yet we have long said that “there is
room for play in the joints” between them. In other words, there are
some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not
required by the Free Exercise Clause.
This case involves that “play in the joints” described above.131

Like the majority opinion, Justice Scalia’s dissent suggests that more
was being decided in Davey than the use of public funds to train future
religious leaders:
When the State makes a public benefit generally available, that benefit
becomes part of the baseline against which burdens on religion are
measured; and when the State withholds that benefit from some
individuals solely on the basis of religion, it violates the Free Exercise
Clause no less than if it had imposed a special tax.
That is precisely what the State of Washington has done here. It has
created a generally available public benefit, whose receipt is conditioned
only on academic performance, income, and attendance at an accredited
school. It has then carved out a solitary course of study for exclusion:
theology.132

In an attempt to preempt any overreading of the Court’s opinion,
however, Justice Scalia underscored that “[t]oday’s holding is limited
to training the clergy.” Yet even he conceded that “its logic is readily
extendible, and there are plenty of directions to go.”133 The very lack
of a clear distinction in the Davey decision between the holding and
logical implications in dicta favors a nonminimalist interpretation. A
narrower option would have been to “sa[y] no more than necessary to
justify [the] outcome, and leav[e] as much as possible undecided.”134
129. Id. at 1315-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s dissent.
130. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
131. Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1311 (citations omitted).
132. Id. at 1316 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 1320 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
134. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 3-4. Despite expressing some
uncertainty about the scope of the holding in Davey, Professor Douglas Laycock has
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The Court’s decision in Tennessee v. Lane135 constitutes a more
certain instance of minimalism. The plaintiffs-respondents were
paraplegics who filed an action for damages and equitable relief,
alleging that the State of Tennessee and several of its counties had
denied them physical access to the State’s courts in violation of Title II
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”).136 Among
other things, Title II provides: “[N]o qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation or denied the benefits of the services, programs or
activities of a public entity.”137 The legal question before the Court was
Title II’s validity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court held that Title II constitutes a valid exercise of Congress’
Section 5 power to enforce Section 1’s substantive guarantees, but
limited its holding to the class of cases implicating the fundamental
right of access to the courts — the factual context at issue in the case.
The Justices could have issued several broader holdings. The Court
could have concluded that Title II may never be used by private
litigants to sue states for money damages, as it had held in University
of Alabama v. Garrett regarding Title I of the ADA,138 and as the State
of Tennessee had urged in Lane.139 Or the Court could have concluded
that states may always be sued for money damages by private parties
under Title II, as the Solicitor General had argued in Lane.140 Instead,
the Court in Lane held only that states may be sued by citizens for
money damages when the fundamental constitutional right of access to
the courts is implicated.

convincingly advanced a nonminimalist interpretation of the Court’s decision. See Douglas
Laycock, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Comment: Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of
Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes But Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 155, 161 (2004) (“Davey also poses important questions about the boundaries of its
holding. As written, it applies only to funding the training of clergy, but it may well be
extended to all funding decisions . . . .”); id. at 171 (“Davey held that when the state elects to
fund a category of private-sector programs, it may facially discriminate against religious
programs within the category.”); id. at 173 (“The terse opinion implies more than it states.”);
id. at 185 (“But Davey is likely to lead to a more general principle that all religious programs
and institutions can be excluded from funding programs.”).
135. 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004).
136. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
138. 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Title I of the ADA, which prohibits employment
discrimination against the disabled, was not validly enacted under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and thus that the Eleventh Amendment bars private moneydamages actions for violations of Title I).
139. See generally Brief of Petitioner, Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004) (No. 021667).
140. See generally Brief for the United States, Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004)
(No. 02-1667).
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It is not readily apparent from this disposition how the Court
reasonably could have decided the case more narrowly and shallowly
— the Court’s congruence-and-proportionality jurisprudence from
City of Boerne v. Flores141 onward precludes a wholly case- or factspecific analysis. The outcome in Lane, moreover, appears to reflect a
conscious choice because all the Justices knew from the briefing that
broader options were on the table. The theory of judicial minimalism,
therefore, accounts for at least one significant decision rendered by
the Supreme Court during the October 2003 Term.
B.
1.

Decisions Analyzed Improperly

Not Reaching the Merits: Newdow and Padilla

Other cases from the past Term might appear to some
commentators to reveal “a restrained judicial role,”142 but evidence of
an affinity for minimalism is less apparent upon close examination. It
is true, as Professor Sunstein underscores,143 that the Court “refused to
reach the merits” in two important cases. That fact by itself, however,
does not evidence minimalist decisionmaking. Rather, answering the
minimalism question requires one to determine whether the Court
consciously chose the narrowest and shallowest option when broader
and deeper alternatives were reasonably available. Judged against this
criterion, the Court’s decision in the Pledge of Allegiance case appears
minimalist, but its ruling in the case of Jose Padilla is not.
In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,144 the Court held
that respondent Michael Newdow could not challenge the inclusion of
the words “under God” in recitations of the Pledge of Allegiance at
his daughter’s public elementary school. The Court so concluded
based on a novel, “prudential” — that is, not constitutionally required
— standing theory. Specifically, Justice Stevens wrote these words for
the Court:
In our view, it is improper for the federal courts to entertain a claim
by a plaintiff whose standing to sue is founded on family law rights that
are in dispute when prosecution of the lawsuit may have an adverse
effect on the person who is the source of the plaintiff’s claimed standing.
When hard questions of domestic relations are sure to affect the
outcome, the prudent course is for the federal court to stay its hand
141. 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (articulating the congruence-and-proportionality requirement
in holding that Congress had exceeded its Section 5 authority when it enacted the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993). Specifically, the Court held that, for a federal statute to
be valid under Section 5, “[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.” Id. at 508.
142. Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10.
143. Id.
144. 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
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rather than reach out to resolve a weighty question of federal
constitutional law. . . . We conclude that, having been deprived under
California law of the right to sue as next friend, Newdow lacks prudential
standing to bring this suit in federal court.145

Chief Justice Rehnquist countered that “the Court may have
succeeded in confining this novel principle almost narrowly enough to
be, like the proverbial excursion ticket — good for this day
only . . . .”146 Like the Chief Justice, Justice O’Connor would have
reached the merits and affirmed the constitutionality of public-school
Pledge-recitation policies that include the words “under God.”147
Professor Sunstein sees a Court that “invoked procedural
principles” and “attend[ed] carefully to limits on its own authority . . .
when fundamental issues are at stake.”148 Perhaps. But as the
discussion in Part I makes clear, Professor Sunstein’s submission
regarding Newdow is really a prudentialist point, not a minimalist one.
In any event, the Chief Justice’s persuasive criticism that the Court
was fashioning a prudential standing rule essentially “for this day
only,” — a charge the majority did not seriously dispute — as well as
the broader political context,149 suggests that the Court’s opinion will
have the generative force of a rock. It is therefore not clear how the
Court’s reasoning reasonably could have been any narrower and
shallower. Moreover, the Court could have issued a much broader
ruling by not crafting a novel prudential standing rule and instead
deciding the merits of Newdow’s challenge to public-school Pledgerecitation policies. Accordingly, the decision in Newdow does seem
minimalist.150

145. Id. at 2312.
146. Id. at 2316 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment).
147. Id. at 2321-27 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
148. Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10.
149. See Laycock, supra note 134, at 224 (“No matter how the Court defines a de
minimis exception, it would be hard to fit the Pledge of Allegiance within it. In Newdow, it
may have been politically impossible to affirm and legally impossible to reverse.”); id. at 24546 (“A decision to invalidate the Pledge would have galvanized supporters of governmentsponsored religious observances and quite possibly provoked a constitutional amendment.”).
150. Recall, however, that a minimalist decision does not indicate a minimalist
motivation. Several commentators have sided with the Chief Justice, suggesting that the
Court created limits on its own authority in order to have its cake and eat it too: the Ninth
Circuit’s decision striking down the local school district’s Pledge-recitation policy is no
longer law, yet the Supreme Court did not have to say what the law is, potentially setting off
a political firestorm during an election year. The charge of disingenuousness looms again.
See, e.g., Stuart Taylor Jr., Our Imperial, Unjudicial, Disingenuous, Indispensable Court,
NATIONAL JOURNAL, July 17, 2004, at 2215 (“In short, none of the nine consistently
practices judicial restraint. And when the justices do invoke that ideal, it is often an exercise
in disingenuousness. Take the 5-3 decision on June 14, which ducked the merits of the case
in which a federal appeals court in California had ruled that ‘under God’ must be dropped
when the Pledge of Allegiance is recited in schools . . . . The case presented a dilemma for
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Before concluding that jurisdictional rulings necessarily evidence
the presence of judicial minimalism, however, one should consider the
case of Jose Padilla.151 Padilla is the American citizen who was
apprehended by federal agents in Chicago’s O’Hare International
Airport upon arrival from Pakistan. He was transported to New York
on a material-witness warrant issued by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York in connection with its
grand-jury investigation into the September 11th terrorist attacks. He
was then detained as an alleged “enemy combatant” in the
Consolidated Naval Brig in Charleston, South Carolina by order of
President Bush.152 Seeking to challenge his indefinite detention,
Padilla filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the New York
federal court against Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. As Professor
Sunstein stresses, the Court, through the Chief Justice, did not decide
the merits of the controversy, “insist[ing]” instead “on procedural

the four liberals and Kennedy. A decision striking out ‘under God’ would have provoked an
election-year firestorm, perhaps even a constitutional amendment.”).
Perhaps tellingly, the Court did not heed one of its traditional policies of restraint —
deference to the federal courts of appeals regarding the interpretation of state law — to
support its holding that Newdow lacked prudential standing to sue. See, e.g., Bowen v.
Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 908 (1988); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 346-47 (1976). The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that, because noncustodial parents have a state-law right to expose
their children to their beliefs and values, Newdow was injured since state law “surely does
not permit official state indoctrination of an impressionable child on a daily basis with an
official view of religion contrary to the express wishes of either a custodial or noncustodial
parent.” Newdow v. United States Congress, 313 F.3d 500, 504-05 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court
disagreed:
The California cases [on which the Ninth Circuit relied in holding that Newdow had
standing] simply do not stand for the proposition that Newdow has a right to dictate to
others what they may and may not say to his child respecting religion. . . . The cases speak
not at all to the problem of a parent seeking to reach outside the private parent-child sphere
to restrain the acts of a third party.

Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2311-12 (referencing In re Mentry, 142 Cal. App. 3d 260, 268 (1983)
(reversing restraining order against noncustodial father forbidding him from engaging
children in religious activities other than those approved by custodial mother); Murga v.
Peterson, 103 Cal. App. 3d 498, 504-05 (1980) (refusing to restrain noncustodial parent
wishing to expose his children to his religious views)). The Court’s understanding of
California law was reasonable, but then so was the view of the court of appeals. At the very
least, the Ninth Circuit’s understanding was not so unreasonable as to be unworthy of
deference. As the Chief Justice argued, “[r]espondent does not seek to tell just anyone what
he or she may say to his daughter, and he does not seek to vindicate solely her rights.”
Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2316 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment). Rather, he observed,
“respondent wishes to enjoin the School District from endorsing a form of religion
inconsistent with his own views because he has a right to expose his daughter to those views
without the State’s placing its imprimatur on a particular religion.” Id. at 2315.
151. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
152. See Brief for Petitioner, app. D at 5a, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004)
(No. 03-1027) (reproducing the Presidential Order of June 9, 2002 directing the Secretary of
Defense to detain Padilla).
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constraints” and holding that Padilla had sued the wrong person in the
wrong court.153
Yet as Justice Stevens persuasively argued in dissent, those
“procedural constraints” were not genuine constraints at all; rather,
they were of the Court’s own choosing. The Court’s doctrine is riddled
with exceptions to the immediate custodian “rule”:154
Although the Court purports to be enforcing a “bright-line rule”
governing district courts’ jurisdiction, an examination of its opinion
reveals that the line is far from bright. Faced with a series of precedents
emphasizing the writ’s “scope and flexibility,” the Court is forced to
acknowledge the numerous exceptions we have made to the immediate
custodian rule. The rule does not apply, the Court admits, when physical
custody is not at issue, or when American citizens are confined overseas,
or when the petitioner has been transferred after filing, or when the
custodian is “‘present’” in the district through his agents’ conduct. In
recognizing exception upon exception and corollaries to corollaries, the
Court itself persuasively demonstrates that the rule is not ironclad. It is,
instead, a workable general rule that frequently gives way outside the
context of “‘core challenges’” to Executive confinement.
In the Court’s view, respondent’s detention falls within the category
of “‘core challenges’” because it is “not unique in any way that would
provide arguable basis for a departure from the immediate custodian
rule.” It is, however, disingenuous at best to classify respondent’s
petition with run-of-the-mill collateral attacks on federal criminal
convictions. On the contrary, this case is singular not only because it calls
into question decisions made by the Secretary himself, but also because
those decisions have created a unique and unprecedented threat to the
freedom of every American citizen.155

Justice Stevens also might have stressed — and not merely hinted
at156— the risk of forum shopping by the Executive Branch.157 It is
doubtful that the Government’s detention of alleged enemy

153. In particular, the Court held that Melanie A. Marr, the commander of the South
Carolina Naval Brig, is the only proper respondent to Padilla’s petition because she, not
Secretary Rumsfeld, is Padilla’s custodian. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2717-22. The Court further
concluded that the Southern District of New York did not have personal jurisdiction over
Commander Marr. Id. at 2722-25.
154. The general rule in habeas law is that the proper respondent to a habeas petition
filed by a detainee who challenges the legality of his confinement is the prisoner’s immediate
custodian — that is, the warden of the facility in which the detainee is being held. See, e.g.,
Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2731 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“All Members of this Court agree that
the immediate custodian rule should control in the ordinary case and that habeas petitioners
should not be permitted to engage in forum shopping.”).
155. Id. at 2732-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
156. Id. at 2734-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. Leading Cases, supra note 64, at 416 (noting that in the “context [of] executive
detention,” the “habeas jurisdiction default rules” upon which the Padilla majority relied
“empower limitless executive forum shopping”).
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combatants within the Fourth Circuit is coincidental. That federal
court of appeals is widely regarded as among the most conservative
and pro-Government in the nation.158
In appearing to accept the Justices’ rhetoric of restraint
uncritically in both Newdow and Padilla, the theory of minimalism
risks giving the impression that it is strikingly idealistic, even naïve.
But such an impression would be false: In his book on minimalism,
Professor Sunstein is a realist in assessing justiciability doctrine: “It
may be tempting to see these principles [of justiciability] as firm, rulebound law, allowing no room for discretionary judgments. But
realistically speaking, justiciability doctrines are used prudentially and
strategically . . . .”159
By disposing of Padilla on the procedural ground it chose,
moreover, the Court laid down a broad rule with inevitable
implications for an important question of federal law that currently
divides several federal courts of appeals: whether the Attorney
General is a proper respondent to a habeas petition filed by an alien
detained pending deportation.160 That issue matters because, among
other things, “there are indications that the district courts in areas
where immigration detention centers are located have been flooded
with detainee habeas petitions. This influx may seriously threaten
some district courts’ ability to consider petitions in a reasonably
prompt manner.”161 Chief Justice Rehnquist dropped a footnote

158. See, e.g., Deborah Sontag, The Power of the Fourth, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, § 6
(Magazine), at 38 (detailing the court’s strong conservatism). There may be reason to
question Sontag’s objectivity in view of how unfavorably she portrays the Fourth Circuit’s
decisionmaking. I do not think it is controversial, however, to characterize that court as
among the most conservative federal courts of appeals in the nation as a relative matter, just
as it would not be controversial to characterize the Ninth Circuit as among the most liberal.
159. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 39-40. Compare Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (per curiam) (“None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial
authority than are the Members of this Court, and none stand more in admiration of the
Constitution’s design to leave the selection of the President to the people, through their
legislatures, and to the political sphere. When contending parties invoke the process of the
courts, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and
constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to confront.”), with Cass Sunstein,
What We’ll Remember in 2050, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Jan. 5, 2001, at B1516, reprinted in BUSH V. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND THE COMMENTARY 339-40 (E.J.
Dionne Jr. & William Kristol eds., 2001) (predicting that “millions of Americans [will come
to] believ[e] that the court . . . acted in an unacceptably partisan manner, and not as a court
of law at all,” and that the Court’s decision will be remembered in hindsight as “illegitimate,
undemocratic, and unprincipled”).
160. Compare Robledo-Gonzales v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2003) (Attorney
General is not proper respondent), Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314 (6th Cir. 2003) (same),
Vasquez v. Reno, 233 F.3d 688 (1st Cir. 2000) (same), and Yi v. Maugans, 24 F.3d 500 (3d
Cir. 1994) (same), with Armentero v. INS, 340 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2003) (Attorney General
is proper respondent). Cf. Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing the
issue at length but not deciding the question).
161. Armentero, 340 F.3d at 1069.
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stating — without explanation — that the Court was not deciding the
circuit split.162 But the Court’s reasoning, which focuses on the location
of the detainee’s immediate physical custodian, appears squarely
applicable in the INS setting. The Chief Justice reasoned as follows:
In accord with the statutory language and Wales’ immediate custodian
rule, longstanding practice confirms that in habeas challenges to present
physical confinement — “core challenges” — the default rule is that the
proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is
being held, not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory
official. No exceptions to this rule, either recognized or proposed [by
Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion], apply here.163

None of the exceptions discussed by the majority or Justice Kennedy
— that is, a court-martial convict detained outside the territorial
jurisdiction of any district court, nonphysical custody, dual custody,
removal of the petitioner from a district’s territory after a petition has
been filed, or certain kinds of unfair behavior by the Government164 —
appears to apply in the INS context.165
To generate direct implications for a question of such moment in
an extraordinary, nonimmigration case and in the absence of much
briefing on the probable consequences is aggressive. The Court’s
chosen path is all the more aggressive because the outcome in Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld,166 the case involving an American citizen also detained in
the South Carolina brig after his capture in Afghanistan, affects
mightily — if not ultimately determines — the upshot of federal-court
review of Padilla’s contentions.167 Indeed, it is not difficult to count
five votes for the proposition that Padilla’s detention is

162. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2718 n.8 (“In Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), we left
open the question whether the Attorney General is a proper respondent to a habeas petition
filed by an alien detained pending deportation. Id.[] at 189. . . . Because the issue is not
before us today, we again decline to resolve it.”) (parallel citations omitted).
163. Id. at 2718 (referencing Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885)) (citations and
footnote omitted).
164. Id. at 2718 n.9, 2721-24; id. at 2729 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
165. That said, it would be most welcome if the Court somehow were to prove this
concern unfounded or if Congress were to address the problem by relieving some of the
pressure on the affected district-court dockets.
166. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
167. Padilla’s attorney, Donna Newman, refiled the habeas petition in South Carolina
District Court. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Padilla v. Hanft, No. Civ. A. 2:04-222126A (D.S.C. July 2, 2004). On February 28, 2005, U.S. District Judge Henry F. Floyd held
that the President has no authority to detain Padilla as an enemy combatant, and he ordered
the Government either to charge Padilla with a crime or to release him within forty-five
days. See Padilla v. Hanft, No. Civ. A. 2:04-2221-26A, 2005 WL 465691, at *13 (D.S.C. Feb.
28, 2005). The Government is currently appealing Judge Floyd’s decision to the Fourth
Circuit.
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unconstitutional: the four Padilla dissenters plus Justice Scalia.168 In
his dissent in Hamdi, which was joined by Justice Stevens, Justice
Scalia provides a historical analysis whose conclusion is sweeping:
Where the Government accuses a citizen of waging war against it, our
constitutional tradition has been to prosecute him in federal court for
treason or some other crime. Where the exigencies of war prevent that,
the Constitution’s Suspension Clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, allows Congress to
relax the usual protections temporarily. Absent suspension, however, the
Executive’s assertion of military exigency has not been thought sufficient
to permit detention without charge. No one contends that the
congressional Authorization for Use of Military Force, on which the
Government relies to justify its actions here, is an implementation of the
Suspension Clause. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision below.169

The same reasoning applies with (at least) equal force to Padilla given
that the Government seized him on American soil, as opposed to in a
theater of military operations abroad.
In other words, the Court in Padilla had a narrower option. The
Justices could have decided the merits, which had already in effect
been decided in Hamdi, thereby avoiding a broad ruling on an
unsettled procedural question with seemingly mammoth implications.
But, it could be objected, how could the Court have reached the
merits without deciding the threshold immediate-custodian question
one way or the other? Justice Stevens explained how the Justices
could have resolved that issue in a more factbound and narrow
fashion:
More narrowly, we agree that if jurisdiction was proper when the petition
was filed, it cannot be defeated by a later transfer of the prisoner to
another district. . . .
It is reasonable to assume that if the Government had given [Donna]
Newman, who was then representing respondent in an adversary
proceeding, notice of its intent to ask the District Court to vacate the
outstanding material witness warrant and transfer custody to the
Department of Defense, Newman would have filed the habeas petition
then and there, rather than waiting two days. Under that scenario,
respondent’s immediate custodian would then have been physically

168. In Padilla, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
concluded that Congress had not authorized Padilla’s detention: “Consistent with the
judgment of the Court of Appeals, I believe that the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 4001(a), prohibits — and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution, 115
Stat. 224, adopted on September 18, 2001, does not authorize — the protracted,
incommunicado detention of American citizens arrested in the United States.” 124 S. Ct. at
2735, n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2660-61 (referencing the Authorization for Use of Military
Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)). For detailed discussion of Hamdi, see infra
notes 208-222, 282-290 and accompanying text.
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present in the Southern District of New York carrying out orders of the
Secretary of Defense. Surely at that time Secretary Rumsfeld, rather
than the lesser official who placed the handcuffs on petitioner, would
have been the proper person to name as a respondent to that petition.
The difference between that scenario and the secret transfer that
actually occurred should not affect our decision, for we should not permit
the Government to obtain a tactical advantage as a consequence of an ex
parte proceeding. The departure from the time-honored practice of
giving one’s adversary fair notice of an intent to present an important
motion to the court justifies treating the habeas application as the
functional equivalent of one filed two days earlier.170

Despite initial appearances, therefore, Padilla is not a poster child for
minimalism by virtue of its disposition on jurisdictional grounds.
On the other hand, it could forcefully be argued that I just cheated
in applying the operational definition of minimalism. I have shown
that the approach of the Padilla dissenters was narrower than that of
the majority. I have not demonstrated how the Padilla majority could
have decided the case the same way — reversing the judgment of the
Second Circuit — on a narrower ground. The point of the above
analysis, however, was not to change (or forget) the rules of the
minimalist inquiry, but to refute the claim that jurisdictional rulings
are necessarily narrower and shallower than decisions on the merits.
Applying minimalism’s operational definition to Padilla, it appears
that a narrower option was reasonably available to the majority.
Rather than deciding the controversial immediate-custodian question,
the Court could have taken issue with the Second Circuit’s holding
that the district court had personal jurisdiction over Secretary
Rumsfeld under New York’s long-arm statute.171 As that court noted,
the state’s statute had never been applied in an analogous setting,172
and surely the New York legislature had never contemplated its
application to the facts of Padilla. Granted, the Court’s typical
practice is to defer to federal courts of appeals on questions of state
law, but that did not stop the majority from showing no such deference
in Newdow.173 Moreover, to the extent one insists on the rightness of
the lower courts’ interpretation of New York’s long-arm statute, it
appears that the “operational” definition of minimalism is more
subject to dispute than we might at first imagine because its criteria
require making substantive and contestable judgments on the merits
of legal questions.
170. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2731-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations and footnote
omitted).
171. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F. 3d 695, 708-710 (2d Cir. 2003) (analyzing the
applicability of the state’s long-arm statute), rev’d, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
172. Id. at 710.
173. See supra note 150.
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It is noteworthy that four of the five members of the majority in
the minimalist Pledge decision — Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer — dissented in Padilla. Likewise, the Chief Justice and
Justices O’Connor and Thomas, who were in the majority in Padilla,
would have upheld the constitutionality of Pledge recitations in public
schools. Only Justice Kennedy was in the majority in both cases.
(Justice Scalia recused himself in the Pledge case after publicly
criticizing the Ninth Circuit’s decision.174) With eight out of nine
Justices on opposite sides of what Professor Sunstein sees as
minimalist holdings, the question arises whether the theory of judicial
minimalism provides a persuasive account of the Court’s
decisionmaking in both those cases. At a minimum, minimalists bear
the burden of offering a more complex, counterintuitive account, one
that explains how minimalism emerges from shifting coalitions of
Justices, some of whom are committed to a nonminimalist
jurisprudence much of the time.
2.

Reaching the Merits: Rasul, Ashcroft v. ACLU, and Cheney

Still other important decisions from the October 2003 Term reveal
the limits of minimalism as an organizing framework for
understanding the Court’s work. Professor Sunstein submits that the
Justices decided the Guantanamo Bay, child online pornography, and
energy task force cases “in the narrowest possible fashion.”175 Most of
those opinions reveal a different picture.
The Court, according to Professor Sunstein, evidenced minimalism
in Rasul v. Bush176 by holding only that federal courts have authority
to entertain habeas petitions filed by aliens held at Guantanamo
Bay.177 Specifically, he stresses that “the court pointedly declined to
specify the nature of the hearing — to say, for example, whether
foreigners have a right to a lawyer.”178 He fails to register, however,
that the threshold question of judicial power to entertain the petitions
was the sole issue before the Justices when the case was decided. Here
is the first sentence of Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court:
These two cases present the narrow but important question whether
United States courts lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to the
legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in

174. See 124 S. Ct. at 2304 (noting Justice Scalia’s recusal); Laycock, supra note 134, at
159, n.19 (documenting the series of events culminating in Justice Scalia’s recusal).
175. Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10.
176. 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
177. Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10.
178. Id.
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connection with hostilities and incarcerated at the Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base, Cuba.179

To return to a recurring theme, not deciding questions not presented
is not evidence of minimalism.
On the other hand, there would seem to be no reason why
evidence informing the minimalist inquiry should be limited to the
merits stage as opposed to the certiorari stage, even if Professor
Sunstein devotes almost all his attention to the former.180 Nor must
evidence of minimalism be confined to the text of published opinions.
When granting certiorari, the Court sometimes rewrites the questions
presented as articulated by the parties or chooses to review only
certain questions presented.181 Rasul is a good example of an instance
in which the Court chose not to address a question of substantive
rights that was presented at the certiorari stage. The Justices’ decision
to proceed in such a fashion evidences narrowness.182
Yet the Court reasonably could have resolved the threshold
jurisdictional question in Rasul more narrowly. Specifically, the
majority could have followed Justice Kennedy’s lead,183 making clear
that its holding was limited to detainees held at Guantanamo Bay in
179. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
181. See, e.g., Docket for Rasul v. Bush, No. 03-334, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
docket/03-334.htm (last visited April 1, 2005) (“Petition GRANTED limited to the following
Question . . . .”); Docket for Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, No. 02-1624, at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/02-1624.htm (last visited April 1, 2005) (“Petition
GRANTED limited to the following Questions . . . .”).
Most of the time, moreover, the Justices have a variety of vehicles from which to choose
at the certiorari stage. Those vehicles present different facts and therefore somewhat
different legal questions for resolution. The Court typically makes decisions among those
vehicles, albeit in a manner not accessible to public scrutiny. In choosing, the Justices could
adopt a minimalist approach by choosing a fact pattern with narrower and shallower legal
implications.
182. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i-ii, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (No.
03-334) [hereinafter Rasul petition] (two of three questions presented directed at the
merits). Specifically, the first question presented raised the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction under Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), see infra note 186, and the
second and third (somewhat redundantly) asserted due process claims. For example, this was
the third question presented in the petition:
Does the Due Process [C]lause of the Fifth Amendment permit the United States to detain
foreign nationals indefinitely, in solitary confinement, without charges and without recourse
to any legal process, so long as they are held outside the “ultimate sovereignty” of the
United States, even when they are held in territory over which the United States has
exclusive jurisdiction and control?

Rasul petition at i-ii. For a discussion of the substantial confusion generated by the Supreme
Court’s refusal to address the merits in Rasul, see infra Section III.A.
183. See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2701 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (“In light of the
status of Guantanamo Bay and the indefinite pretrial detention of the detainees, I would
hold that federal-court jurisdiction is permitted in these cases. This approach would avoid
creating automatic statutory authority to adjudicate the claims of persons located outside the
United States, and remains true to the reasoning of Eisentrager.”).
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view of the area’s essentially unique legal status and the detainees’
indefinite detention.184 Instead, the broad and somewhat ambiguous
reasoning in the majority opinion caused Justice Scalia, in dissent, to
exclaim with some justification that “the Court boldly extends the
scope of the habeas statute to the four corners of the earth,”185 and
also to contend that the majority had implicitly overruled controlling
precedent.186 Rasul is no instance of minimalism.
Turning next to Ashcroft v. ACLU,187 Professor Sunstein asserts
that “[t]he court followed a remarkably similar path in its inconclusive
decision involving the Child Online Protection Act [(“COPA”)],
which criminalizes the commercial posting of sexually explicit material
that is ‘harmful to minors’” where the commercial entities posting the
material do not verify that each online visitor is at least 18 years old.188
“The court upheld a lower court’s temporary injunction against the
act,” he notes, “but only on the narrow ground that less restrictive
methods, like filtering software, might protect children more
effectively than a criminal ban.”189 He further observes that the Court
“[p]ostpon[ed] a final resolution” and instead “asked for a full trial,
offering the government an opportunity to prove its claim that the act
is the only realistic method of achieving Congress’s goal.”190 Justice
184. The United States occupies a naval base at Guantanamo Bay under a lease and
treaty recognizing Cuba’s ultimate sovereignty, but giving the United States “complete
jurisdiction and control” for so long as it does not abandon the leased areas. Lease of Lands
for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, T.S. No. 418; see also
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690-91 (discussing this legal arrangement).
185. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2706; see also Jeffrey Rosen, Divide and Rule, NEW REPUBLIC,
July 26, 2004, at 11, 11 (“Cass R. Sunstein . . . praised the Court for deciding the
Guantanamo Bay case in the ‘narrowest possible fashion,’ while Justice Antonin Scalia
criticized the Court for indulging in ‘judicial adventurism of the worst sort.’”).
186. See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court today holds that the
habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, extends to aliens detained by the United States military
overseas, outside the sovereign borders of the United States and beyond the territorial
jurisdictions of all its courts. This is not only a novel holding; it contradicts a half-century-old
precedent on which the military undoubtedly relied . . . .”) (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763 (1950)). Eisentrager concerned German nationals who were confined in the
custody of the United States Army in Germany following their conviction by a military
commission of having engaged in military activity against the United States in China after
Germany’s surrender. The Court held that they had no right to file a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus to test the legality of their detention. Before Rasul came down, many jurists
had thought the Guantanamo detainees were similarly situated — that is, aliens detained
outside the territorial jurisdiction of any federal court. In Rasul itself, District Judge Colleen
Kollar-Kotelly had dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C.
2002), and the D.C. Circuit had affirmed, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
187. 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004).
188. Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10 (quoting COPA, 47 U.S.C. § 231
(2000)).
189. Id.
190. Id. In evaluating COPA, the Court applied strict scrutiny to nonobscene sexual
speech for the second time in recent years. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc.,
529 U.S. 803 (2000). That is a significant change in First Amendment law, and one with
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Breyer, by contrast, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice O’Connor,
would have had the Court construe the statute’s coverage narrowly to
uphold it, rather than block Congress’ attempt to limit children’s
widespread access to pornography on the World Wide Web.191
Professor Sunstein is correct that the Court’s empirical focus on
less restrictive alternatives is narrower and shallower than other paths
the Justices might have taken. He also would have been right to
suggest that a minimalist approach seems commendable in light of
changes in computer technology (and thus in the facts on the ground
in the case) since the litigation’s inception.192 The majority’s chosen
course, nonetheless, was not the minimalist option.
Several considerations, including the case’s procedural posture and
the corresponding abuse-of-discretion standard of review, support the
Court’s decision, but they do not suggest that the Justices can fairly lay
claim to the mantle of minimalism. Because the only issue before the
Court was whether to uphold or overturn the preliminary injunction,
the decision was not minimalist just because the Justices decided only
that question. As Professor Sunstein relates,193 the Court emphasized
respondents’ submission that blocking and filtering software is less
restrictive than the statutory scheme Congress had enacted; in the
Court’s view, the Government had not shown it would be likely to
disprove that contention at trial.194
That, however, is not all the Court said:
Filters also may well be more effective than COPA. First, a filter can
prevent minors from seeing all pornography, not just pornography
posted to the Web from America. The District Court noted in its
factfindings that one witness estimated that 40% of harmful-to-minors
content comes from overseas. COPA does not prevent minors from
having access to those foreign harmful materials. That alone makes it
possible that filtering software might be more effective in serving
Congress’ goals. Effectiveness is likely to diminish even further if COPA
is upheld, because the providers of the materials that would be covered
by the statute simply can move their operations overseas. It is not an
answer to say that COPA reaches some amount of materials that are
harmful to minors; the question is whether it would reach more of them

which Justice Scalia registered his strong disagreement. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. at
2797 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. at 2797-806 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
192. See id. at 2787 (noting that “the factual record does not reflect current
technological reality”); see also SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 174 (“I
urge that a form of minimalism makes particular sense for the new communications
technologies, including the Internet. The most important reason is that the relevant facts are
in flux and changing very rapidly, and the consequences of current developments are hard to
foresee.”).
193. See Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10.
194. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. at 2790-95.
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than less restrictive alternatives. In addition, the District Court found
that verification systems may be subject to evasion and circumvention,
for example by minors who have their own credit cards. Finally, filters
also may be more effective because they can be applied to all forms of
Internet communication, including e-mail, not just communications
available via the World Wide Web.
That filtering software may well be more effective than COPA is
confirmed by the findings of the Commission on Child Online
Protection, a blue-ribbon commission created by Congress in COPA
itself. Congress directed the Commission to evaluate the relative merits
of different means of restricting minors’ ability to gain access to harmful
materials on the Internet. It unambiguously found that filters are more
effective than age-verification requirements. Thus, not only has the
Government failed to carry its burden of showing the District Court that
the proposed alternative is less effective, but also a Government
Commission appointed to consider the question has concluded just the
opposite. That finding supports our conclusion that the District Court did
not abuse its discretion in enjoining the statute.195

A minimalist Court — that is, one concerned to decide the case before
it as narrowly and shallowly as reasonably possible — would not have
made it so clear to the courts below that it favors filtering software.
After all, filters need not be more effective to support the district
court’s entry of a preliminary injunction; equal effectiveness is
sufficient. Judges tend not to like being reversed on appeal, and the
judges who do the reversing know this very well. After learning that
five Justices favor filtering software, the lower courts in Ashcroft v.
ACLU probably will find it difficult to avoid putting a thumb (or two)
on the scale in favor of filters during and after trial on remand. “The
Court’s opinion leaves Congress and interested persons asking
whether any regulation of nonobscene Internet materials can pass
muster. . . . [T]he Court seemed to be telling Congress that, because
filters already exist, Congress cannot regulate indecent
communication on the Internet.”196

195. Id. at 2792-93 (citations omitted).
196. Leading Cases, supra note 64, at 354, 361. The situation in Ashcroft v. ACLU
illustrates the point developed in Part I that using democratic deliberation as the
decisionmaking criterion renders minimalism nonfalsifiable because the question whether a
decision is minimalist becomes endlessly debatable. That case creates a genuinely difficult
problem for any Justice who wants to use his or her vote to advance democratic deliberation
in the presence of social disagreement. On the one hand, the outdated factual record caused
by rapidly changing computer technologies suggests that democratic deliberation might be
enhanced most effectively by deciding less rather than more. On the other hand, the
appearance of stringing Congress along and extending the agony yet again by prolonging the
inevitable may be difficult to avoid once the Court sends the case back down again for
further proceedings. Indeed, from the standpoint of facilitating democratic deliberation and
responsiveness to the Court’s decisions, Justice Breyer makes a powerful case in his dissent
that his approach is most efficacious. Specifically, he directs this rhetorical question at the
majority opinion’s author, Justice Kennedy, who also dissented in Blakely:
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Finally, in Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of
Columbia,197 Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club sued, among others,
Vice President Cheney, seeking disclosure of the members of his
energy-policy task force. The task force had been established to give
advice and make energy-policy recommendations to President Bush.
The complaint alleged that nonfederal employees and private
lobbyists regularly attended and fully participated in the task force’s
nonpublic meetings. The two public-interest groups urged that such
participation triggered the procedural and disclosure requirements of
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”), which apply where
not all participants are “full-time, or permanent part-time, [federal]
[W]hat has happened to the “constructive discourse between our courts and our
legislatures” that “is an integral and admirable part of the constitutional design”? [Blakely v.
Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2550 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)]. After eight years of
legislative effort, two statutes, and three Supreme Court cases the Court sends this case back
to the District Court for further proceedings. What proceedings? I have found no offer by
either party to present more relevant evidence. What remains to be litigated? I know the
Court says that the parties may “introduce further evidence” as to the “relative
restrictiveness and effectiveness of alternatives to the statute.” But I do not understand what
that new evidence might consist of.
Moreover, Congress passed the current statute “[i]n response to the Court’s decision in
Reno” striking down an earlier statutory effort to deal with the same problem. Congress read
Reno with care. It dedicated itself to the task of drafting a statute that would meet each and
every criticism of the predecessor statute that this Court set forth in Reno. It incorporated
language from the Court’s precedents, particularly the Miller standard, virtually
verbatim. . . . What else was Congress supposed to do?
. . . [S]ome Members of the Court . . . have taken the view that the First Amendment simply
does not permit Congress to legislate in this area. Others believe that the Amendment does
not permit Congress to legislate in certain ways, for example, through the imposition of
criminal penalties for obscenity. There are strong constitutional arguments favoring these
views. But the Court itself does not adopt those views. Instead, it finds that the Government
has not proved the nonexistence of “less restrictive alternatives.” That finding, if appropriate
here, is universally appropriate. And if universally appropriate, it denies to Congress, in
practice, the legislative leeway that the Court’s language seem to promise. If this statute does
not pass the Court’s “less restrictive alternative” test, what does? If nothing does, then the
Court should say so clearly.

Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. at 2804-05 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justices
motivated by minimalism in Ashcroft v. ACLU risk suffering a self-inflicted wound. As
Justice Breyer fears, it is possible Congress and concerned citizens will view the Court as
having transformed interbranch dialogue and democratic deliberation into an exercise in
futility. Democratic actors can become fatigued.
Yet it could be argued in response to Justice Breyer that what COPA accomplished was
less anything that could fairly be called democratic deliberation than it was simply an effort
by Congress to go as far legislatively as it could go along the child-protective lines it favored
subject to the unavoidable constraint of satisfying the Court. Such a congressional reaction
to Supreme Court decisionmaking constitutes neither deliberation nor “constructive
discourse” in any strong sense, id. at 2804 (Breyer, J., dissenting), and it certainly is not the
sort of rational reflection that Professor Sunstein champions.
This example demonstrates a key point: Figuring out whether and how to be a
minimalist can require a complicated calculus that often will prove uncertain and
controversial. Likewise, commentators who endeavor to confirm or disconfirm the presence
of democracy-promoting decisionmaking criteria in judicial opinions face an almost
impossible empirical task.
197. 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004).
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officers or employees.”198 Among other things, the district court
entered orders allowing the plaintiffs to conduct limited discovery to
ascertain the energy task force’s structure and membership.
The Vice President requested that the district court halt
proceedings on separation of powers grounds. Professor Sunstein
observes that “the [Supreme Court] again proceeded cautiously” by
rejecting that argument, but “requir[ing] the lower courts to take
account of the vice president’s need for confidentiality.”199 The D.C.
Circuit, the Supreme Court essentially held, had wrongly concluded
that the Government’s ability to protect its rights by asserting
executive privilege in the district court stripped the appellate court of
mandamus authority. At the same time, however, the Court did not
order the court of appeals to issue mandamus against the district
court, instead leaving it to the appellate court to address the parties’
arguments and other matters bearing on the question whether
mandamus should issue. In short, the Court concluded only that lower
courts entertaining mandamus petitions involving the President or
Vice President must consider separation of powers concerns even
absent assertion of executive privilege.200
Professor Sunstein is correct that the Court “proceeded
cautiously.” The Court’s display of caution seems well explained by
several legal and factual considerations. These include: the
extraordinary nature of the mandamus remedy;201 the sensitive
separation of powers concerns surrounding the prospect of judicial
interference with the President’s access to confidential policy advice;202
a disagreement among the Justices on the question whether the Vice
President argued merely for less discovery or for no discovery in the
District Court;203 and the significant overlap between the information

198. Cheney, 124 S. Ct. at 2583. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the Vice
President and other defendants did not qualify for the disclosure exemption in § 3(2)(C)(i)
of the statute, which excludes from the statute’s open-meeting and disclosure requirements
“any committee . . . composed wholly of full-time, or permanent part-time, [federal] officers
or employees.” Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2)(C)(i) (2000).
199. Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10.
200. Cheney, 124 S. Ct. at 2586-93.
201. See, e.g., Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259-60 (1947) (holding that mandamus is a
“drastic and extraordinary” remedy “reserved for really extraordinary causes”).
202. See Cheney, 124 S. Ct. at 2582 (noting that enforcement of the discovery orders
“might interfere with” the Vice President and other senior executive-branch officials “in the
discharge of their duties and impinge upon the President’s constitutional prerogatives”).
203. See id. at 2595-601 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg argued that the
Court’s reasoning did not justify its judgment. The remand order, she noted, was premised
on the possibility that the District Court ordered excessive discovery, but the Government, in
her view, had been resisting any discovery. See id. To the extent she is correct, Cheney may,
at least in part, evidence what Professor Sunstein calls “subminimalism.” SUNSTEIN, ONE
CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 10 (suggesting that “subminimalism” can be “understood
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discovery would produce and the ultimate relief sought by the
plaintiffs.204 It does not follow, however, that the Court’s display of
caution necessarily evidences minimalism. The question, as far as
minimalism is concerned, is not whether the Justices were cautious,
but whether the Court consciously chose to decide the case as
narrowly and shallowly as possible when broader and deeper options
were reasonably available.
According to those criteria, the Cheney decision does seem well
described as minimalist. The Court did not resolve the question
whether mandamus should issue when it could have, and reasonably
narrower and shallower options do not appear to have been available.
Rather than accede to the government’s request that the Court invoke
constitutional separation of powers principles fundamentally to
rework the executive branch’s obligations in the litigation process, the
Justices sent the case back to the Court of Appeals.205
Yet, another aspect of the Cheney decision reveals a nonminimalist
tendency. At the end of his opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy
authored these words:
Other matters bearing on whether the writ of mandamus should issue
should also be addressed, in the first instance, by the Court of Appeals
after considering any additional briefs and arguments as it deems
appropriate. We note only that all courts should be mindful of the
burdens imposed on the Executive Branch in any future proceedings.
Special considerations applicable to the President and the Vice President
suggest that the courts should be sensitive to requests by the
Government for interlocutory appeals to reexamine, for example,
whether the statute embodies the de facto membership doctrine.206

The Court here is saying more than it must along the dimension of
breadth in order to decide the case. Specifically, the Justices are
reiterating their skepticism, voiced by some members of the Court at
oral argument, that the D.C. Circuit’s “de facto membership doctrine”
even exists.207 That signal to the court of appeals to reassess its own
precedent is not the handiwork of jurists who consciously choose to
write as narrowly and shallowly as reasonably possible.
as decisions that are conclusory and opaque, and offer little in the way of justification or
guidance for the future”); see also id. at 15-16 (further discussing subminimalism).
204. See Cheney, 124 S. Ct. at 2593-94 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stressing the point set
forth in the text).
205. Accord, Leading Cases, supra note 64, at 257 & n.3 (2004) (interpreting Cheney to
be “a model of judicial minimalism” and citing One Case at a Time).
206. Cheney, 124 S. Ct. at 2593.
207. According to the D.C. Circuit’s de facto membership doctrine, the regular
participation of nongovernment officials renders them de facto members of a government
committee, such that the committee may not benefit from the statutory exemption under
section 3(2) of FACA. See Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 915
(D.C. Cir. 1993); supra note 198.
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Stepping Up: Hamdi

Professor Sunstein acknowledges that Hamdi is the Court’s “most
expansive ruling.”208 He nonetheless applauds its “strong minimalist
features”209 — specifically, the failure of a majority of the Justices to
announce that detained enemy combatants always have a right to
counsel, the Court’s decision to leave open the question whether a
military tribunal could try Americans, and the Justices’ decision not to
engage the Bush administration’s aggressive claims regarding the
scope of the President’s inherent Article II powers as Commander in
Chief.210 As Professor Sunstein appears to concede, however,
descriptive minimalism can rely only modestly on Hamdi: the
decision’s nonminimalist features render it a historic triumph for civil
liberties in wartime.
In her plurality opinion announcing the judgment of the Court,
Justice O’Connor hardly “sa[id] no more than necessary” to decide
the case.211 On the contrary, she emphatically rejected the executive
branch’s assertions of breathtaking presidential power. “We reaffirm
today the fundamental nature of a citizen’s right to be free from
involuntary confinement by his own government without due process
of law,”212 she wrote, underscoring that “[i]t is during our most
challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation’s commitment to
due process is most severely tested; and it is in those times that we
must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we
fight abroad.”213 Through those words, with which most of her
colleagues agreed, it is almost as if Justice O’Connor is rejecting the
premise of Korematsu on behalf of the Court and vowing never to
208. Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10.
209. Id.
210. Id. Moreover, the four Justices who joined Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion
announcing the judgment of the Court decided the question whether Congress had
authorized Hamdi’s detention as narrowly as reasonably possible. Specifically, the plurality
assumed without deciding that: (1) congressional authorization of Hamdi’s detention was
constitutionally required; and (2) the Non-Detention Act (NDA), 18 U. S. C. § 4001(a),
which provides that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United
States except pursuant to an Act of Congress,” applied to Hamdi’s detention. 124 S. Ct. at
2639-40. The plurality then concluded that the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(“AUMF”), see supra notes 168-169, enacted one week after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, satisfied the NDA’s requirement of an “Act of Congress.” 124 S. Ct. at
2640-43. The AUMF authorized the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force
against those . . . he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks.” Justices Souter and Ginsburg, by contrast, would have considered each of the
above three questions and decided all of them against the executive branch. 124 S. Ct. at
2652-59 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in judgment).
211. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 3-4.
212. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2647 (2004).
213. Id. at 2648.
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make the same mistake again.214 “We therefore hold,” she wrote, “that
a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy
combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification,
and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions
before a neutral decisionmaker.”215 “In so holding,” Justice O’Connor
continued:
we necessarily reject the Government’s assertion that separation of
powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in
such circumstances. Indeed, the position that the courts must forgo any
examination of the individual case and focus exclusively on the legality of
the broader detention scheme cannot be mandated by any reasonable
view of separation of powers, as this approach serves only to condense
power into a single branch of government. We have long since made
clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it
comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens. Youngstown Sheet & Tube
[Co. v. Sawyer], 343 U.S. [579.] 587 [(1952)]. Whatever power the United

214. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (affirming petitioner’s
conviction for remaining in a part of a designated “military area” from which persons of
Japanese ancestry had been ordered excluded). Justice Jackson wrote these chilling words in
dissent:
Much is said of the danger to liberty from the Army program for deporting and detaining
these citizens of Japanese extraction. But a judicial construction of the due process clause
that will sustain this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of the
order itself. A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the
military emergency. Even during that period a succeeding commander may revoke it all. But
once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the
Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions
such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in
criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens. The principle then lies about like
a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim
of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and
thinking and expands it to new purposes. All who observe the work of courts are familiar
with what Judge Cardozo described as “the tendency of a principle to expand itself to the
limit of its logic.” A military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it
is an incident. But if we review and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of
the Constitution. There it has a generative power of its own, and all that it creates will be in
its own image. Nothing better illustrates this danger than does the Court’s opinion in this
case.

Id. at 245-46 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF
JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921)) (footnote omitted). It may be that some of Justice
O’Connor’s inspired language in Hamdi was drafted within the long shadow cast by
Korematsu. That decision, though never overruled, has been firmly rejected by the court of
history. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, A Prescription for Perilous Times, 93 GEORGETOWN L.J.
(forthcoming Summer 2005) (reviewing GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE
SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM
(2004)). Justice Souter’s opinion in Hamdi explicitly relied on Korematsu. His conclusion
that Congress had not authorized Hamdi’s detention was based in part on his recognition
that the Non-Detention Act, see supra note 210, was passed “for the purpose of avoiding
another Korematsu.” 124 S. Ct. at 2653 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part, and concurring in judgment). For an examination of Korematsu’s possible
impact on the Court’s decision in Hamdi, see Neil S. Siegel, Korematsu’s Shadow
(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
THE

215. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648.
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States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with
other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most
assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties
are at stake. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (it was
“the central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that, within our
political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three
coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty”); Home
Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (“[E]ven the
war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding
essential liberties.”). Likewise, we have made clear that, unless Congress
acts to suspend it, the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows the Judicial
Branch to play a necessary role in maintaining this delicate balance of
governance, serving as an important judicial check on the Executive’s
discretion in the realm of detentions. See [INS v.] St. Cyr, 533 U.S. [289,]
301 [2001] (“At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as
a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that
context that its protections have been strongest”). Thus . . . it would turn
our system of checks and balances on its head to suggest that a citizen
could not make his way to court with a challenge to the factual basis for
his detention by his government, simply because the Executive opposes
making available such a challenge. Absent suspension of the writ by
Congress, a citizen detained as an enemy combatant is entitled to this
process.216

That the Justices could have said more — a fact of life at the Court —
is insufficient to establish the presence of minimalism.
The decision in Hamdi is not minimalist in part because the
plurality here is displaying greater analytical depth than it must to
decide the case. Justice O’Connor’s opinion is grounded in a highly
theorized — indeed, Madisonian217 — conception of the separation of
powers. Articulating grave concerns about the condensation of power
in the executive branch was not necessary to decide the case; a
reliance on precedent — for example, the decisions cited by Justice
O’Connor in the quotation above — would have sufficed. Four other
Justices, moreover, displayed similar levels of theorization.218
216. Id. at 2650-51 (parallel citations omitted).
217. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 262 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982)
(“But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same
department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the necessary
constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others.”).
218. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2652-60 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part, and concurring in judgment) (concluding that congressional
authorization was necessary to detain Hamdi based explicitly on a Madisonian
understanding of human nature and the separation of powers, and determining that Hamdi’s
detention was unlawful based on a lack of congressional authorization); id. at 2660-74
(Scalia, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding based on an extensive historical
analysis that Hamdi’s detention was unlawful absent suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus). Justice Souter further stated:
For reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of the Government asked to counter a
serious threat is not the branch on which to rest the Nation’s entire reliance in striking the
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Turning to the circumstances of Hamdi’s detention, Justice
O’Connor pulled no punches in assessing the Government’s conduct
to date: “Plainly, the ‘process’ Hamdi has received is not that to which
he is entitled under the Due Process Clause.”219 And though the
plurality did, among other things,220 decline to announce that detained
enemy combatants always have a right to counsel, Justice O’Connor
also wrote these words:
Since our grant of certiorari in this case, Hamdi has been appointed
counsel, with whom he has met for consultation purposes on several
occasions, and with whom he is now being granted unmonitored
meetings. He unquestionably has the right to access to counsel in
connection with the proceedings on remand.221

Because Hamdi was no longer being denied access to counsel, and
because the Government could no longer plausibly maintain that it
had an interest in again denying Hamdi access to counsel after
allowing him to consult with an attorney several times, the Court was
not required to address the extent of Hamdi’s right to counsel on
remand. Thus, the decision in Hamdi is not minimalist along the
analytical dimension of breadth as well.
In sum, Justice O’Connor made clear that neither assertions of
presidential power nor pleas for judicial restraint would succeed in
removing the Court from the critical separation of powers dynamic
“when individual liberties are at stake.”222 The outcome in Hamdi was
not maximalist, but neither was it minimalist along the dimension of
depth or breadth. Indeed, the Court there confronted much of what
minimalism would have had the Justices avoid.
balance between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to victory; the
responsibility for security will naturally amplify the claim that security legitimately raises. A
reasonable balance is more likely to be reached on the judgment of a different branch, just
as Madison said in remarking that ‘the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several
offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other — that the private interest
of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights.’ The Federalist No. 51, p. 349 (J.
Cooke ed. 1961). Hence the need for an assessment by Congress before citizens are subject
to lockup, and likewise the need for a clearly expressed congressional resolution of the
competing claims.

Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2655 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in
judgment); see also supra note 169 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Scalia’s
dissenting opinion).
219. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2651.
220. Justice O’Connor also wrote: “Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as
the most reliable available evidence from the Government in [an enemy combatant]
proceeding,” id. at 2649; “the Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor
of the Government’s evidence, so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and
fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided,” id.; and “[t]here remains the possibility that the
standards we have articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly
constituted military tribunal,” id. at 2651.
221. Id. at 2652.
222. Id. at 2650.
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The Verdict

If judicial minimalism is supposed to have empirical relevance as a
description of the way the Supreme Court actually decides cases, then
the theory requires an operational definition that can be falsified — a
definition, in other words, that is capable of relatively uncontroversial
application. Part I identified the best such definition available, and this
Part has applied the operational criterion to many of the most
important decisions from the October 2003 Term. The upshot of the
foregoing investigation does not bode well for minimalism’s
descriptive aspirations: the suggestion that judicial minimalism
triumphed at the Supreme Court during the October 2003 Term is,
with few exceptions, descriptively false.
Rather than consistently apply an operational definition of judicial
minimalism, Professor Sunstein perceives evidence of minimalism
where the Justices left questions undecided, resolved a case on
jurisdictional grounds, decided only the question presented, or
proceeded with caution. Professor Sunstein’s theory of judicial
minimalism, therefore, appears either to have no operational criterion,
or to be false. The Justices did not consciously choose to resolve most
of the cases discussed above as narrowly and shallowly as reasonably
possible, even though broader and deeper rationales were reasonably
available to them.223
Not even Justice O’Connor. In his review of One Case at a Time,
Jeffrey Rosen chose the label “O’Connorism” to describe minimalist
legal theory.224 “By embracing shallowness as a judicial virtue,” he

223. It has been suggested to me that Professor Sunstein might find the outcome of this
Article’s empirical analysis unsurprising because there may be a certain disingenuousness to
his assertion that most of the Justices are minimalists. Rather than really believing that to be
the case, this argument runs, his descriptive claim is aspirational — that is, he means to
persuade the current conservative Court and possibly the next one that it ought to be a
minimalist decisionmaking institution. This argument might be regarded as a social variant
of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in physics; the suggestion is that Professor Sunstein
hopes to change the Court’s decisionmaking through the very act of observing its
decisionmaking. See, e.g., HEINZ R. PAGELS, THE COSMIC CODE: QUANTUM PHYSICS AS
THE LANGUAGE OF NATURE 89-91 (1982) (discussing the impossibility of knowing the
position and momentum of an electron simultaneously, because the act of observing its
position changes its momentum). Lacking direct evidence to substantiate such a charge
regarding Professor Sunstein’s motivation, I do not think it appropriate to question his bona
fides; this article certainly takes him at his word.
It may be worth noting, however, that the use of descriptive claims as vehicles for
normative advocacy is rampant not only in legal academia, but also in legal practice and
judicial decisionmaking. For example, when the top-side and bottom-side briefs — or
majority opinions and dissents for that matter — seem to be discussing different cases in
describing the holdings of the very same precedents, there is often more going on than a
genuine disagreement regarding the meaning and binding force of past decisions. Given the
normative power of the actual in both law and popular culture, convincing people that what
ought to be already is would seem to be an effective rhetorical strategy.
224. Rosen, supra note 48, at 46.
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wrote, “Sunstein is advocating a version of the personalized
jurisprudence of Sandra Day O’Connor.”225 By likening minimalism to
“O’Connorism,” Professor Rosen, among other things, effectively
clipped the wings of Professor Sunstein’s aggressive descriptive claim
that most of the current Justices embrace his theory.226
The foregoing analysis of decisions that came down during the
October 2003 Term suggests that minimalism is indeed closer to
“O’Connorism” than to an apt description of the Court’s work as a
whole. During that year, the Court was not minimalist; instead, Justice
O’Connor tended to be one of the most inclined towards narrow and
shallow decisions among nine jurists with diverse ideological and
methodological commitments. And though Justice O’Connor’s vote
often proved critical, she sometimes was not in the majority in
important cases. Emblematic examples include Blakely, Crawford, and
Ashcroft v. ACLU.
But the story of the October 2003 Term is more complicated than
that. The above investigation also suggests that not even Justice
O’Connor is genuinely a judicial minimalist. In the October 2003
Term, the theory could not adequately account for much of her voting
behavior. When she was in the majority in momentous cases, she often
could not be fairly described as a minimalist. That is one
jurisprudential lesson to be drawn from decisions such as McConnell,
Rasul, Padilla, and Hamdi. In Newdow, moreover, she was neither in
the majority nor a minimalist. Accordingly, it can prove difficult to
make persuasive minimalist generalizations about the Justice most
oriented towards narrow and shallow decisionmaking, let alone the
entire Court. If the October 2003 Term is consistent with a larger
picture, and I suspect it is, this Court does not tend to be a minimalist
decisionmaking institution.227

225. Id.
226. See supra text accompanying note 17.
227. An adequate defense of that claim is beyond the scope of this inquiry. See supra
Introduction to Part II. And while offering only a sampling of decisions as suggestive of the
Court’s generally nonminimalist character runs the risk of selection bias, id., it is nonetheless
worth considering whether these controversial cases from the past ten years are fairly
described as having been decided as narrowly and shallowly as reasonably possible:
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute making it a crime for
two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due
Process Clause); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding constitutional the
University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action admissions program); Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (holding that an Ohio school voucher program, which
included sectarian private schools, did not violate the Establishment Clause); Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in
capital prosecutions is violated by an Arizona statute pursuant to which, following a jury
adjudication of a defendant’s guilt of first-degree murder, the trial judge alone determines
the presence or absence of the aggravating factors required by state law for imposition of the
death penalty); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the execution of any
mentally retarded individual constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by the
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Academic theories of judicial behavior, including Professor
Sunstein’s contribution, at times perceive general truths when
outcomes are highly contingent on the tendencies of particular Justices
— proclivities admitting of important exceptions that may ultimately
swallow the proffered general rule. If Justice O’Connor is succeeded
shortly by more of a maximalist, the theory of judicial minimalism may
join her in retirement.228 Even if she had stayed on the Court for
several more years, the theory would have found itself struggling to
explain the Justices’ decisions if the October 2003 Term had turned
out to be a harbinger of those to come.
III. NORMATIVE PROBLEMS
Part II demonstrated that minimalism does not provide a viable
empirical account of recent Rehnquist Court decisionmaking. The
question remains, however, whether there exists reason to adopt
minimalism as a normative theory of judicial review. Can normative
considerations be invoked to justify minimalism? This Part argues that
the answer is no. Specifically, I show that the empirically testable
version of minimalism does not serve the various substantive values
rejected in Part I as an inadequate account of any version of
minimalism that would be empirically testable — namely, cost

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)
(holding that application of New Jersey’s public accommodations law to require the Boy
Scouts to admit homosexuals violated the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of expressive
association); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that, other than the fact
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that neither the Commerce Clause
nor Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorized Congress to enact a provision of the
Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, providing a federal civil remedy for
victims of gender-motivated violence); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that
Congress may not subject a state to any suit in state court without its consent); Clinton v.
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (holding that the Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C. § 691
et seq., violated the Presentment Clause); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (relying
on a Tenth Amendment anticommandeering rationale in holding unconstitutional certain
interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(s), which
required state and local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on
prospective handgun purchasers and to perform certain related tasks); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (articulating a novel congruence-and-proportionality
requirement in holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et
seq., exceeded Congress’ enforcement powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that
Congress may not use any Article I, Section 8 power to abrogate state sovereign immunity);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that all federal, as well as
state and local, affirmative action programs are subject to strict scrutiny).
228. On July 1, 2005, Justice O’Connor informed President Bush of her “decision to
retire from [her] position as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
effective
upon
the
nomination
and
confirmation
of
[her]
successor.”
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/press/oconnor070105.pdf.
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minimization, democracy promotion, and achieving overlapping
consensus, thereby negotiating theoretical disagreements.
Professor Sunstein claims that judicial minimalism possesses a
number of “attractive features.”229 He suggests that minimalism “is
likely to reduce the burdens of judicial decision,” by which he means
that minimalism makes it easier for jurists on a multimember court
“who disagree on a great deal,” and who are short on both time and
access to information, to get their work done.230 Professor Sunstein
also asserts that “minimalism is likely to make judicial errors less
frequent and (above all) less damaging,” because “[a] court that leaves
things open will not foreclose options in a way that may do a great
deal of harm,” especially in light of “unanticipated bad
consequences.”231 Further, and perhaps most critically, Professor
Sunstein believes that judicial minimalism promotes democratic
deliberation by leaving more questions to the democratic process:
There is a relationship between judicial minimalism and democratic
deliberation. Of course minimalist rulings increase the space for further
reflection and debate at the local, state, and national levels, simply
because they do not foreclose subsequent decisions. And if the Court
wants to promote more democracy and more deliberation, certain forms
of minimalism will help it to do so.232

Relatedly, Professor Sunstein argues that minimalist jurists, by
rendering shallow decisions, help a democratic society to negotiate the
reasonable yet irreconcilable disagreements that are inevitable in a
modern, pluralistic community.233 Finally, Professor Sunstein suggests
that minimalism allows jurists to avoid the need for constitutional
theory.234 Unlike originalists, for example, minimalists need not “take
a position on some large-scale controversies about the legitimate role
of the Supreme Court in the constitutional order.”235
In my judgment, Professor Sunstein fails to establish any of these
claims. Moreover, I will argue that the Court’s principal role in our
constitutional system — that is, guardian of the fundamental rights of
individuals — often will be advanced most effectively through
relatively broad and deep judicial decisionmaking, not through narrow
and shallow opinions.

229. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 4.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at ix-x, 50-51.
234. Id. at 8 (section entitled “Against Theories, against Rules”).
235. Id.
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A. Multiplying Decision and Error Costs: The Court as Guide
Despite his initial suggestion that minimalism “is likely to reduce
the burdens of judicial decision,”236 Professor Sunstein later
acknowledges that the answer to this empirical question is uncertain
and complex:
A court that economizes on decision costs for itself may in the process
‘export’ decision costs to other people, including litigants and judges in
subsequent cases who must give content to the law. Such costs may also
be faced by those who are trying to plan their affairs and who must try to
figure out what the law will ultimately be.237

Similarly, Professor Sunstein first asserts that “minimalism is likely to
make judicial errors less frequent and (above all) less damaging.”238
Elsewhere in One Case at a Time, however, he is not so optimistic. He
acknowledges that minimalism may not be “the best way to reduce
total error costs,” particularly in situations where “lower courts and
subsequent cases would generate an even higher rate of error.”239
Such a costly course of events seems difficult to avoid after
decisions such as Tennessee v. Lane.240 The Justices there offered lower
courts little guidance regarding how they should handle future cases in
which private plaintiffs seek money damages from States for violations
of Title II of the ADA. To begin with, the Court declined to clarify
whether the fundamental-rights dimension of the case was critical to
the holding. Assuming for the sake of argument it was, moreover, the
Court did not specify how much of a nexus is required between a
case’s factual setting and heightened judicial scrutiny under Section 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment before Congress may be held to have
enacted valid Section 5 legislation in the many Title II contexts not
covered by the Court’s decision.241 In addition, the Court did not offer
any guidance regarding how to identify the relevant “context” within
which its novel and inappropriately labeled “as applied” Section 5
analysis should be conducted. Why was the implicated class of cases in
Lane “access to courts,” as opposed to something narrower (such as
physical access to court proceedings) or something broader (such as
access to all government buildings and programs)? Judged against
whatever the Supreme Court will hold in future decisions, it seems
inevitable that a number of lower courts will decide (or already have

236. Id. at 4.
237. Id. at 48.
238. Id. at 4.
239. Id. at 49-50.
240. See supra notes 135-141 and accompanying text (discussing Lane).
241. Recall that Title II covers every one of a state’s public services, programs, and
activities. See supra notes 136-137 and accompanying text.
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decided) Title II-Section 5 cases incorrectly, either by holding an
application of Title II in a particular setting valid or invalid under
Section 5.242
Because the Justices did not answer the central analytical questions
generated by the Court’s resolution of the case, it seems perilous to
offer much more by way of prediction at this point. The Court left
open the possibility that all of Title II is valid under Section 5. It also
left open the possibility that Title II is valid under Section 5 only in
those classes of cases (however defined) implicating fundamental
rights — though in Lane itself the factual nexus to any fundamentalrights violation was highly attenuated.243
As a general matter, there seems to be little reason to suppose that
overall costs in the legal and political systems will be minimized by a
Supreme Court that decides cases as narrowly and shallowly as
reasonably possible. Pre-empirically, it appears more likely that
whatever costs the Court saves itself by taking a minimalist path will
be outweighed by the costs incurred by litigants, lower courts, and
political bodies at the federal, state, and local levels, as judicial,
legislative, and executive officials are required to act in the wake of
guidance from the Court that would have been clearer had its opinion
been broader and deeper.244 Professor Rosen has advanced a
persuasive argument along these lines:
When the Supreme Court issues terse opinions whose reasoning is hard
to discern, it compounds the confusion of inferior courts in precisely
those cases where the relevant actors are pleading for a clear resolution.
The result is a national exercise in clairvoyance, as lower courts, citizens,
and legislatures spend great energy and expense trying to puzzle through

242. On May 16, 2005, the Court granted certiorari in, and consolidated, two cases
involving the Section 5 validity of Title II as applied to the administration of prison systems.
See United States v. Georgia, No. 04-1203; Goodman v. Georgia, No. 04-1236.
243. Respondent Beverly Jones never came close to suffering a violation of any of her
constitutional rights. She was a disabled court reporter who alleged lost work and inability to
participate in the judicial process. See 124 S. Ct. at 1982-83; id. at 2000, n.4 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). Respondent George Lane presents a somewhat closer case. He was initially
required to crawl up two flights of stairs to attend the hearings in his criminal trial. When he
returned to the courthouse for a subsequent hearing and refused to crawl again or be carried
up the stairs by officers, he was arrested and imprisoned for failure to appear. The state,
however, later held a preliminary hearing in Lane’s case in the first-floor courthouse library
and offered to move all further proceedings to an accessible courthouse in a town nearby.
See 124 S. Ct. at 1982-83; id. at 2000, n.4 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Considering Jones and
Lane together, it would seem inappropriate after Lane for courts to require even as much as
a reasonable probability of a fundamental-rights violation in a particular setting before
declaring Title II valid under Section 5 across the implicated class of cases. Some possibility
of such a violation would appear to suffice. Of course, in the event all of Title II remains
valid under Section 5, this “nexus” question need not be asked.
244. See, e.g., Leading Cases, supra note 64, at 253 (calling Cheney “a model of judicial
minimalism” and stating that “[t]he Court’s opinion, if nothing else an exercise in measured
unclarity, left lower courts with little guidance in effectuating the Court’s holding”).
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problems that the Supreme Court promised but then refused to
resolve.245

Perhaps this concern explains why Professor Sunstein vacillates
between asserting confidently that “minimalism is likely to make
judicial errors less frequent and (above all) less damaging,”246 and
conceding cautiously that “[i]t is not, however, clear that minimalism
is the best way to reduce total error costs.”247
Indeed, often it is critical that the Court provide guidance, either
to the lower courts or to the political process. Even nonminimalist
decisions such as Blakely, which leave thousands of judges and lawyers
alike in semi-desperate need of guidance, ought to give pause to
advocates of less-is-more jurisprudence. Judicial “activism,”
“overreaching,” and “arrogance” are charges that are most familiar,248
but there also exists the danger that the Court will say too little. As
Chief Justice Marshall stressed early on, “[i]t is emphatically” not only
the “province” but also the “duty” of the Supreme Court “to say what
the law is.”249
Professor Sunstein acknowledges “the need for planning”; he notes
that “[m]inimalism might be threatening to the rule of law insofar as it
does not ensure that decisions are announced in advance.”250 At the
same time, however, one must wonder whether that “qualificatio[n]”251
will tend to swallow the theory most of the time. Granted, Blakely
constitutes an extreme example of a pressing need for planning. But
that need will often be pressing when the Supreme Court grants
certiorari in a case to resolve a conflict over the resolution of an
important but unsettled question of federal law.252 In other words,
cases in which the need for planning — for ordering human affairs in
reliance on a relatively stable legal rule — is not implicated do not
tend to be important cases. And with grants so few and therefore so
precious,253 the Justices endeavor to avoid granting certiorari to
resolve unimportant questions.
245. Rosen, supra note 48, at 46; see also supra note 81.
246. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 4.
247. Id. at 49.
248. See, e.g., George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (February 2, 2005), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050202-11.html (“Because marriage is
a sacred institution and the foundation of society, it should not be re-defined by activist
judges. For the good of families, children, and society, I support a constitutional amendment
to protect the institution of marriage.”).
249. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
250. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 55.
251. Id. at 57.
252. See Rosen, supra note 48, at 46 (“But isn’t ‘planning’ important in every case that
the Supreme Court agrees to hear?”).
253. See supra note 33.
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Rasul, another nonminimalist decision, also nicely illustrates this
point. The Court’s refusal in that case to move beyond the threshold
jurisdictional question and to address the merits of the petitioners’ due
process challenges has resulted in substantial confusion. Specifically,
two federal district courts in the D.C. Circuit have rendered
diametrically opposed decisions concerning the constitutional rights of
the detainees being held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.254 The Court’s
relative modesty in Rasul, therefore, has generated massive headaches
for litigants and the lower federal courts. One legal commentator has
captured the public spectacle with insightful humor:
It’s almost impossible to comprehend how, as of yesterday, two
federal judges in the District of Columbia managed to read Rasul to
mean two completely opposite things — as though it’s one of those pickyour-own-endings books from the 1980s. . . .
....
. . . [W]hile we are laying blame here, it may be worth considering that
the Supreme Court bears the most responsibility for not getting Rasul
right — or at least clear — the first time. The opaque John Paul Stevens
opinion, coupled with Anthony Kennedy’s concurrence (which at least
implies that military tribunals might provide sufficient due process for
these prisoners), are ambiguous enough to allow the government and
judiciary to play the kinds of semantic chutes and ladders it now
plays. . . . No one opposes judicial restraint or minimalism; judges should
decide only the matters directly before them. But when the highest court
in the land only half decides a matter squarely before it — when it
decides that prisoners languishing for years in detention have certain
inalienable-rights-to-be-named-later, it’s tantamount to having decided
nothing at all.255

This wasteful legal wrangling in the D.C. Circuit might not be taking
place had the Supreme Court decided more in Rasul. Yet minimalism
would have had the Court decide even less.
254. Compare Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding, in denying
habeas petitions, that the President’s war powers and a federal statute authorized him to
capture and detain combatants; that his authority was not confined to capture and detention
on battlefields in Afghanistan; that nonresident aliens captured and detained outside the
United States have no cognizable constitutional rights; that their capture and detention did
not violate any federal law or treaty giving rise to rights; and that separation of powers
principles prohibited inquiry into the conditions of their detention under international
norms), with In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding
that the detainees have a Fifth Amendment right to due process of law; that they stated a
Fifth Amendment claim because the Combatant Status Review Tribunal relied on classified
information not shown to them; that due process required the tribunal to determine whether
evidence was gained through torture; that the detainees had a valid due process claim based
on the government’s use of an overly broad definition of “enemy combatant” subject to
indefinite detention; and that the Geneva Conventions applied to Taliban detainees, but not
to members of al Qaeda).
255. Dahlia Lithwick, Supreme Chickens?: The high court’s Gitmo confusion comes
home to roost, SLATE, Feb. 1, 2005, at http://politics.slate.msn.com/id/2113003.
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Newdow exemplifies another problem with the prospect of a truly
minimalist Court. The Chief Justice’s criticism of the majority opinion
as disingenuous, as in essence “good for this day only,” raises a
significant concern: From the standpoint of legal technique and craft,
deciding a case as narrowly and shallowly as reasonably possible may
invite unprincipled decisionmaking because the minimalist decision
commits the Court to little in the future. And even if one assumes that
the Justices themselves (including future Justices) will be able to tell
when and why they “cheated” in a previous case, they make law for
many other courts as well. The jobs of the jurists who sit on those
tribunals are difficult enough without their also having to figure out
when to take Supreme Court decisions seriously and when to squint.256
Moreover, unprincipled judicial decisionmaking imposes distinct
legitimacy costs on the Court itself.
Considering decision costs and error costs together, Professor
Sunstein offers this sobering qualification, which threatens to give
away his entire theory:
In this light it would be foolish to suggest either that minimalism is
generally a good strategy or that minimalism is generally a blunder.
Everything depends on contextual considerations. The only point that is
clear even in the abstract is that sometimes the minimalist approach is
the best way to minimize the sum of error costs and decision costs.257

This is a remarkably weak statement. Substitute the words
“maximalism” and “maximalist approach” for “minimalism” and
“minimalist approach” in the above quotation, and the reasoning
remains equally plausible. It seems, therefore, that Professor
Sunstein’s theoretical defense of judicial minimalism has less to do
with minimizing decision and error costs, and more to do with other
considerations.258

256. Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer have written:
The vision of the Court as constitutional interpreter, which is our vision, . . . is a vision that
sees the Court being much more concerned with instructing, guiding, helping, and, indeed,
ordering other bodies and other branches than the volume and style of its current output
would suggest. And if these are or should be the Court’s concerns, then we would expect to
see more clear rules, fewer divided judgments without a majority opinion, more concern by
the Justices for the Court speaking with a single voice than with making their own points or
even with insisting on their own view about the outcome, even more concern with stare
decisis, and in general more Supreme Court behavior befitting the law-maker that the
Supreme Court undeniably is, and in our judgment inevitably must be. . . . [U]nder our
vision it needs to spend much more time thinking about how it can give better guidance to
Congress, to the executive, to lower courts, and to the states.

Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST.
COMMENT. 455, 479-80 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
257. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 50.
258. Professor Sunstein’s concession that the case for minimalism ultimately turns on
distinctly empirical — as opposed to theoretical — questions is noteworthy because he
advocates minimalism without first having conducted any sort of empirical analysis of the
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Leaving Things to the Courts, Not the Country

“My most important goal,” Professor Sunstein writes in the
Preface to One Case at a Time, “is to explore the connection between
judicial minimalism and democratic self-government.”259 Likewise, the
Conclusion to the book is entitled “Minimalism and Democracy.”260
From start to finish, the theme on which he lays greatest emphasis is
the connection he proffers between judicial minimalism and
democratic deliberation:
The final and perhaps most important point involves the relationship
between minimalism and democracy. We have seen that one of the major
advantages of minimalism is that it grants a certain latitude to other
branches. It allows the democratic process a great deal of room in which
to adapt to coming developments, to produce mutually advantageous
compromises, and to add new information and perspectives to legal
issues.261

Respectfully, Professor Sunstein fails to establish that minimalism
significantly advances his deliberative democratic project: rather than
leaving issues to the democratic process and promoting democratic
deliberation, minimalist Justices often simply postpone the questions
they do not decide for future litigation. Consider again, for example,
the minimalism evident in Newdow.262 The Court in effect left the
question presented on the merits — the constitutionality of voluntary
public-school Pledge-recitation policies — for the lower federal courts
and, possibly, for the Court itself in a later case. Absent a
constitutional amendment, the federal courts, not the democratic
process, will ultimately decide whether public-school recitations of the
phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance violate the
Establishment Clause. Even putting the decisionmaker aside,
moreover, it is difficult to see what the minimalism evident in Newdow

relative costs and benefits. His approach illustrates the force of Judge Richard Posner’s
argument that constitutional law is in need of less theory and more facts:
[C]onstitutional theory is not responsive to, and indeed tends to occlude, the greatest need
of constitutional adjudicators, which is the need for empirical knowledge . . . . I know that
just getting the facts right can’t decide a case. There has to be an analytic framework to fit
the facts into; without it they can have no normative significance. Only I don’t think that
constitutional theory can supply that framework. Nor that the design of the framework, as
distinct from fitting the facts into it, is the big problem in constitutional law today. The big
problem is not lack of theory, but lack of knowledge — lack of the very knowledge that
academic research, rather than the litigation process, is best designed to produce. But it is a
different kind of research from what constitutional theorists conduct.

Posner, supra note 1, at 3.
259. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at xiv.
260. Id. at 259.
261. Id. at 53.
262. See supra notes 142-150 and accompanying text.
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has to do with the principled promotion of democratic deliberation or
negotiation of moral fault lines in American society. The vast majority
of Americans, the President, and members of Congress are not going
to be persuaded that it is unconstitutional for public-school children
voluntarily to recite the words “under God” in the Pledge.
Newdow is hardly unique in this regard; the consequences of other
minimalist decisions could be used to make a similar point. After the
Court’s holding in Tennessee v. Lane,263 the courts, not the political
process, will decide whether States can be sued by private citizens
under Title II of the ADA in contexts other than that of access to the
courts. Similarly, the courts, not the people or their representatives,
will decide the sensitive, complex legal questions implicated in the
Cheney case.264
Newdow illustrates another mismatch between the means of
judicial minimalism and the end of democracy promotion. One cost of
minimalist decisions is that they do not attract the same level of public
attention as do sweeping judicial rulings, and therefore do not prompt
the same type of vigorous public response. Had the Supreme Court in
Newdow declared unconstitutional voluntary public-school Pledgerecitation policies, the issue of future judicial appointments would
have played a far larger role in the 2004 Presidential election than it in
fact did.265
To be sure, none of these examples compels the conclusion that
the practice of judicial minimalism will never serve to enhance the
quality of democratic deliberation in American society. But they do
suggest how attenuated the link is between the practice of minimalism
and the democratic values motivating Professor Sunstein’s project.
C.

Overlapping Consensus: Why and How?

The political philosophy of John Rawls stresses the challenge of
negotiating successfully the reasonable yet irreconcilable
disagreements regarding basic questions of religion, morality, and
philosophy that characterize modern, heterogeneous, democratic
societies.266 Rawls asks how such a pluralistic society can achieve social
unity in the context of a just society, constituted by free and equal

263. See supra notes 135-141, 240-243 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 197-207, 244 and accompanying text.
265. On judicial appointments and the election, see, for example, Neil S. Siegel, The
election and the U.S. Supreme Court, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 2, 2004, § 1, at 21, which states:
It is unfortunate that a sitting justice’s illness should be necessary to focus the public’s
attention on the critical legal questions that hang in the balance. But that is where we are.
Voters should ask what kind of Supreme Court they want for the next few decades before
casting their ballots.

266. See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
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citizens, and governed through democratic institutions. His answer is
an overlapping consensus on a political conception of justice.267 “Such
a consensus,” he writes, “consists of all the reasonable opposing
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines likely to persist over
generations and to gain a sizable body of adherents in a more or less
just constitutional regime, a regime in which the criterion of justice is
that political conception itself.”268
Inspired by Rawls’ theorizing about justice, Professor Sunstein
seeks to apply Rawlsian political philosophy to constitutional
decisionmaking:
[A] minimalist court attempts to achieve a great goal of [a
heterogeneous] society: making agreement possible when agreement is
necessary, and making agreement unnecessary when agreement is
impossible. This goal is associated both with promoting social stability
and with achieving a form of mutual respect.269

Professor Sunstein’s assumptions and conclusions are suspect. For one
thing, this defense of minimalism assumes that “promoting social
stability” and “achieving a form of mutual respect” can be more
important than protecting fundamental constitutional rights. More
concretely, considerations of social stability support the proposition
that the Court should not have decided Brown v. Board of
Education.270 It was not obvious to many Americans in the 1950s that
de jure segregation was unreasonable, let alone a moral and
constitutional outrage. Indeed, parts of the country were polarized
over the issue, and the Court came close to losing its bet with
constitutional destiny as massive resistance in Southern states
threatened outright repudiation of the Brown decision.271
Nor is it evident that minimalist judicial decisions actually will tend
to achieve the goal of stabilizing society and promoting mutual
respect. One possible approach to this vexing problem would be to
suggest that the common ground among diverse Justices who sign on
to minimalist decisions may have the best chance of matching the
overlapping consensus in American society. Yet this line of thinking is
subject to the critique previously articulated at the end of Part I:
minimalism requires a story connecting the ideological and
methodological views of the Justices to divergences in the population
at large. Otherwise, compromising on principle to get along with one’s
colleagues has little to do with the democratic values minimalism
seeks to promote. Pre-empirically and as a general matter, it seems
267. See id. at 15.
268. Id.
269. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 50.
270. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
271. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 694 (2d ed. 2005).
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just as likely that narrow and shallow Supreme Court rulings will
extend the agony by stringing the country along with unclear decisions
as social conflicts continue to fester — until the Court finally steps in
and provides real guidance.
D. Theory’s Unavoidability
As explored earlier,272 there is much to be said for Professor
Sunstein’s recognition that the theoretical ambition of contemporary
constitutional theory renders the field somewhat out of touch with the
practice of constitutional adjudication. He goes too far in the other
direction, however, in suggesting that judicial minimalists can sidestep
basic questions about “the legitimate role of the Supreme Court in the
constitutional order.”273 This is a critical point. Minimalists cannot
avoid constitutional theory because minimalism cannot identify when
minimalism should be employed. Rather, minimalism itself
presupposes an antecedent, broader theoretical enterprise, one of
whose purposes is to evaluate whether and when a narrow and shallow
approach makes sense. The basic aim of this nonminimalist theoretical
endeavor is to distinguish questions that are for the political process
from those that are for the courts. Professor Sunstein implicitly, if
unwittingly, concedes this point in stating that most of the Justices
“embrace minimalism — usually, not always — for reasons connected
with their conception of the role of the Supreme Court in American
government.”274
Indeed, Professor Sunstein himself participates in this broader
theoretical enterprise in at least two ways. First, he chooses to focus
on the avoidance of decision and error costs and the promotion of
democratic deliberation and overlapping consensus as constitutional
values that judicial decisionmaking should advance. Second, he
sketches when a narrow and shallow approach makes sense from the
standpoint of best advancing those values.275 He therefore stresses that

272. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text (critiquing the turn to high theory in
academic constitutional law).
273. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 8.
274. Id. at 9. It might be suggested in response that Professor Sunstein’s theory makes
room for broad Hamdi-type decisions — that it allows for the exceptional movement to
grand theory. Indeed, minimalism might be justified in part because it not only allows for the
special, grand case but also gives special import and majesty to such a case. To be sure,
Professor Sunstein would agree that there is some place, however limited, for breadth and
depth on the Supreme Court. But the point remains that in order to create such space, he
must step outside his theory of judicial minimalism; the theory itself does not provide any
room.
275. Id. at 46-60 (identifying, inter alia, the problems with judicial minimalism in certain
settings, and recommending when minimalism, as opposed to maximalism, should be
employed).
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“the choice between minimalism and the alternatives depends partly
on pragmatic considerations and partly on judgments about the
capacities of various institutional actors.”276 He further submits that a
minimalist approach is not advisable when “the interest at stake ought
to be judged off-limits to politics,”277 but that in other situations
“democracy-promoting forms of minimalism, designed to promote
both accountability and reason-giving, are appropriate and salutary
judicial functions; they promote constitutional ideals without risking
excessive judicial intervention into political domains.”278
The theory of judicial minimalism, therefore, does not alter the
important lesson, instantiated in decisions such as Brown and Hamdi,
for which modern constitutional theory must account: leaving
questions to the majoritarian political process is not an inherent good
in a democratic society. Rather, a constitutional democracy should be
guided by a persuasive account of which issues are for the political
process and which are for the courts. Constitutional theory will prove
useful in this regard only to the extent it makes sense of the actual
practice of constitutional adjudication and helps that practice to fulfill
its deepest aspirations by clarifying the judiciary’s appropriate role in
the American system of government.
To meet that challenge, an attractive constitutional theory must
transcend a narrow and shallow approach to constitutional
decisionmaking. Judicial minimalism can provide no guidance
concerning the foundational questions of constitutional theory:
clarifying whether and when the Supreme Court should stay its hand,
when the Justices should intervene in the political process to a limited
extent, and when the Court should step up and expound robustly the
fundamental law of the Constitution. Rich jurisprudential traditions
are associated with each of those postures. They include the judicialrestraint school of Justice Frankfurter and Professors Bickel and

276. Id. at 56. Specifically, Professor Sunstein argues:
[I]t is worthwhile to attempt a broad and deep solution (1) when judges have considerable
confidence in the merits of that solution, (2) when the solution can reduce costly uncertainty
for future courts and litigants, (3) when advance planning is important, and (4) when a
maximalist approach will promote democratic goals either by creating the preconditions for
democracy or by imposing good incentives on elected officials, incentives to which they are
likely to be responsive. Minimalism becomes more attractive (1) when judges are proceeding
in the midst of (constitutionally relevant) factual or moral uncertainty and rapidly changing
circumstances, (2) when any solution seems likely to be confounded by future cases,
(3) when the need for advance planning does not seem insistent, and (4) when the
preconditions for democratic self-government are not at stake and democratic goals are not
likely to be promoted by a rule-bound judgment.

Id. at 57.
277. Id. at 56.
278. Id. at 28. See also id. at 26 (distinguishing among “democracy-promoting,
democracy-foreclosing, and democracy-permitting outcomes”).
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Ely,279 the heroic tradition of Brown, and — one should not forget —
the negative heroic tradition of Korematsu and Dred Scott v.
Sandford.280 Inductively, through close study of actual constitutional
cases, modern constitutional theory can help the bench and bar to sort
out when and why the Justices should assume one judicial role rather
than another. The suggestion that one of those judicial postures does
and should dominate misses a lot of what is — and ought to be —
going on inside a sophisticated institution in our democracy and
throughout much of our history.
Narrow and shallow decisions, in other words, constitute just one
potential tool. And if all legal scholars have is a hammer, they will err
in perceiving every problem as a nail. If Justices make the same
mistake, the consequences can be unfortunate, even tragic.
E.

The Court as Guardian

Implicit throughout the above assessment of judicial minimalism’s
normative attractiveness is this insistent demand of our constitutional
culture: often the Justices have a duty to resolve important
constitutional questions, especially those implicating the fundamental
rights of individuals.281 This obligation is more important than the ruleof-law values of stability, consistency, predictability, and (I would add)
sincerity implicated in Blakely and Newdow. For example, the
outcome in Hamdi underscores that minimalism writ large would
eviscerate an essential part of the Supreme Court’s role — and
comparative advantage — in our constitutional system of separate but
interrelated powers. Relative to the President, Congress, and the
states, the Justices are more insulated from the pressures of
majoritarian politics and therefore better equipped to protect minority
rights.282 Accordingly, there are times when the Court should step up
to the plate and insist that the Constitution’s protections be vindicated

279. See generally BICKEL, supra note 12; ELY, supra note 24.
280. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
281. Cf. Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism: Restriking the Balance Between
Judicial Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1838 (2004) (“A core value
of the neutral-principles tradition that has been lacking from minimalist theory is its
affirmative, as opposed to just negative, defense of judicial power. Rather than just
defending judicial power on the ground that it is not so bad, the neutral-principles tradition
affirmatively embraced judicial power as a mechanism to enforce the rule of law.”).
282. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 12, at 25-26 (“Judges have, or should have, the leisure,
the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of
government.”); STONE, supra note 214, at 543 (“The comparative advantages of courts over
the executive and legislative branches in interpreting and enforcing constitutional rights are
striking. Responsiveness to the electorate is essential to the day-to-day workings of
democracy, but as the framers of the Constitution well understood, that responsiveness can
also lead elected officials too readily to sacrifice the rights of a despised or feared
minority.”).
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robustly, not narrowly and shallowly. The Court’s decision in Brown v.
Board of Education came close to realizing that aspiration,283 and
Hamdi is no minimalist tract. As the executive branch pressed the
claim that the President possesses inherent authority as Commander
in Chief to designate an American citizen an enemy combatant and to
detain him indefinitely without access to counsel even absent
congressional authorization, the Congress did nothing.284 Congress still
has done nothing. Not so the Court.
Minimalism’s promise, therefore, does not lie in providing a
template for how the Justices should decide most or all cases before
the Court. The potential payoff, rather, resides in prescribing targeted
interventions in a limited number of cases. Those cases do not include
the Blakelys and Hamdis of the docket, where it is altogether
appropriate for the Justices to vindicate basic rule-of-law and
constitutional values. Rather, minimalism may be appropriate in cases
raising questions concerning which, as Professor Sunstein has
developed persuasively,285 there exists profound moral disagreement
within American society; the Court has good reason not to be
confident that it knows (or would be wise to impose on the country at
a certain time) the appropriate resolution; and the citizenry, in
grappling with the question, might profit from — and actually engage
in — further democratic debate and reflection.
Of course, it can be extraordinarily difficult to discern whether a
situation calls for maximalism, minimalism, or something in between.
And while it is a primary task of constitutional theory to provide
guidance on this question, no decision rules are available; resolutions
ultimately turn on such considerations as those discussed immediately
above, as well as careful exercises of the human faculty of judgment.
The answers that are formulated, moreover, inevitably will be
contestable and contested. Leaders within the gay-rights movement in
this country, for example, are currently debating among themselves
whether it would make sense to ease off of litigating the marriage
issue for now and push harder for civil unions — the animating
283. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Some commentators have argued that Brown was not decided
as broadly and (especially) as deeply as the conventional wisdom would have it. See, e.g.,
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 37-39; Rosen, supra note 48, at 44-45. For
example, a lack of depth may in part account for why the Warren Court’s decisions were
ambiguous as applied to the issue of affirmative action. Indeed, it would not be unfair to
suggest that the discussion of Brown in this Article draws not only from what the Court in
Brown actually said, but also from what the decision has come to represent. Even restricting
oneself to the opinion itself, however, Brown is far from minimalist.
284. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2004) (“The Government maintains
that no explicit authorization is required, because the Executive possesses plenary authority
to detain pursuant to Article II of the Constitution.”); Brief for the Respondents at 13-18,
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696) (making this argument).
285. See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 54-60 (articulating the view
expressed in the text).
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concern being that the movements’s legal goals may be years ahead of
its political and cultural strategy.286
Such difficulties of discernment notwithstanding, prescription in
select situations constitutes the defining theme of the legal tradition
from which Professor Sunstein draws much inspiration. Naim v.
Naim,287 to cite an historic example whose extraordinary circumstances
underscore the point, was not understood by Justice Frankfurter or
Professor Bickel to exemplify how the Court should go about its daily
business.288 Rather, it constituted a rare accommodation that principle
made with pragmatism for the ultimate purpose of vindicating
Brown’s promise. Principle lost the battle for a few more years,289 a
significant — and perhaps intolerable — cost, but at least principle put
itself in a position not to lose the war. In other circumstances,
however, leaving more questions to the political process clearly will
not be advisable. In Brown itself, the minimalist option would have
been for the Court to hold that racially segregated schools violated
equal protection because they were funded unequally. The
contemporary constitutional culture in the United States would reject
as indefensible any constitutional theory endorsing that hypothetical
outcome in Brown as preferable to the Court’s actual holding.290
Similarly, it is difficult to see how the country or the Court would have
been better served by a narrower and shallower decision in Hamdi.
286. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Groups Debate Slower Strategy on Gay Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at A1 (“Leaders of the gay rights movement are embroiled in a bitter
and increasingly public debate over whether they should moderate their goals in the wake of
bruising losses in November when 11 states approved constitutional amendments prohibiting
same-sex marriages.”); Adam Liptak, Caution in Court for Gay Rights Groups, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 2004, at A16 (“Fearful that aggressive action could backfire and generate public
hostility, gay rights groups are planning to limit the scope of their legal challenges to the
constitutional amendments banning gay marriage that were passed by 11 states last week.
The groups are making a temporary retreat from their most fundamental goal, winning the
right for same-sex marriages, and focusing instead on those measures that addressed civil
unions in some way.”).
287. 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (refusing to hear a challenge to Virginia’s antimiscegenation
statute).
288. See BICKEL, supra note 12, at 174 (providing the classic defense of the Court’s
action); Neal Devins, The Democracy-Forcing Constitution, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 1981
(1999) (reviewing SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9) (discussing the issue and
quoting a November 4, 1955 memorandum by Justice Frankfurter to the Conference).
289. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (unanimously striking down Virginia’s
antimiscegenation statute as a violation of equal protection and due process).
290. To be sure, Brown had its share of legal critics in the years after it came down. See,
e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 31-34 (1959) (using his notion of “neutral principles” to criticize Brown). But time has so
secured the decision’s legitimacy in the American popular and constitutional culture that not
even a self-described staunch originalist like Justice Scalia is prepared to repudiate that most
nonoriginalist decision. See Margaret Talbot, Supreme Confidence: The Jurisprudence of
Justice Antonin Scalia, THE NEW YORKER, March 28, 2005, at 54 (“Though Scalia says that
he would have voted with the majority in Brown, it’s hard to see an originalist justification
for it.”).
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CONCLUSION
To the extent the theory of judicial minimalism aspires to be a
descriptively accurate account of the Court’s work, it requires a
relatively crisp operational definition that can be falsified. But the
only such definition reasonably available undercuts minimalism’s
normative aspirations. It is doubtful that, understood according to its
operational criterion, the theory will generate the normative benefits
Professor Sunstein identifies. Accordingly, minimalism must either
give up its claims to falsifiability or significantly temper its assertion of
prescriptive appeal.
Moreover, insofar as the foregoing analysis of the October 2003
Term is illustrative of a larger reality, the falsifiable variant of
minimalism is, in fact, descriptively false as a general matter. This
Article has taken seriously the only operational definition of
minimalism discernable in Professor Sunstein’s writings, applied that
definition rigorously, and shown that it fails generally to account for
the Justices’ decisionmaking during an important, recent Term.
Minimalism, in short, cannot have it all. But can it have
something? Most likely, it can. If the version of minimalism that is
empirically testable is neither descriptively valid nor normatively
attractive, then Professor Sunstein’s work can be rehabilitated in at
least two ways. First, minimalism could replace its provocative
descriptive assertion that the Court typically decides cases “as
narrowly and shallowly as possible” with the more modest — but less
clearly inaccurate — suggestion that a majority of the Justices
(whether considered individually or collectively) tend to favor
relatively narrow and shallow holdings; that is, they tend to forego
broader and deeper alternatives in deciding cases, even if they do not
go so far as to adopt the narrowest and shallowest rationale
reasonably available. That claim, although more difficult to test than
Professor Sunstein’s more aggressive description contention,291 could
nonetheless then be subjected to empirical testing.
Alternatively, judicial minimalism could abandon Professor
Sunstein’s claims of descriptive accuracy and reinterpret itself to be an
entirely normative theory designed to serve certain substantive ends.
Reformulated in this fashion, however, it is not clear what the thrust
of the theory is. If the point is to conserve judicial legitimacy, how
exactly is it distinct from, and similar to, Professor Bickel’s
foundational work on the passive virtues?292 If the purpose, rather, is
to promote democratic deliberation, what can courts do, beyond what

291. See supra note 48.
292. See supra note 12.
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Professor Ely has identified,293 meaningfully to advance that cause? If
the goal is instead overlapping consensus, how does Professor
Sunstein offer a legal theory at all? Finally, if the end of judicial
minimalism is to advance all those values and perhaps others as well,
how do they trade off when they conflict in a given case? In short,
minimalism can be saved as a normative account, but then it seems
underdeveloped at this point. Moreover, Professor Sunstein’s
emphasis on narrowness and shallowness is somewhat misplaced
because a normative theory will call for breadth and depth whenever
necessary to serve the values that the theory is supposed to advance.
My own judgment is that minimalism would be employed most
usefully to counsel close consideration — at the opinion-writing phase
in select situations — of the powerful lessons of prudence, caution,
and restraint that are present in Professor Sunstein’s work. As
indicated above,294 such a move would bring the theory of judicial
minimalism closer to the grand Bickelian tradition into which
Professor Sunstein has breathed new life.

293. See supra note 24.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 285-290 (arguing that minimalism possesses
greater power to prescribe in select situations than to describe the Supreme Court’s general
behavior).

